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Introduction 
The increasing number of barbaric attacks carried out by the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) against the innocent, and its 
resulting war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity must 
be addressed by the international community.1  But another series 
of horrific events in arguably the most important Arab country—
Egypt—also require international attention and call into question 
the United States’ and the West’s policies and practices in the 
Middle East and in the Islamic world generally.2  By refusing to cut 
off military aid to the Egyptian military regime after it overthrew its 
first fairly elected President in 20133 and by continuing massive 
 
 1 How ISIS Crippled al-Qaida, GUARDIAN (June 10, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/10/how-isis-crippled-al-qaida [http:// 
perma.cc/S8QL-5XVL]; see, e.g., Osama Bin Laden Considered ISIS Too Brutal and 
Advised al Qaeda Cadres to Sever Ties with It, SAMAY LIVE (India) (Aug. 12, 2014), 
http://www.saharasamay.com/world-news/676558706/osama-bin-laden-considered-isis-t 
oo-brutal-and-advised-al-qaeda-.html [http://perma.cc/W4YH-GY72] (discussing al 
Qaeda’s disproval of ISIS’s extremism); Tom McDonnell, Questions on President 
Obama’s Strategy Against ISIS, HILL (Sept. 17, 2014), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/homeland-security/217888-questions-on-president-obamas-strategy-against-isis 
[http://perma.cc/6REG-RCTA] (describing the causes for the rise of ISIS). 
 2 See Patrick Kingsley & Marin Chulov, Mohamed Morsi Ousted in Egypt’s Second 
Revolution in Two Years, GUARDIAN (July 4, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2013/jul/03/mohamed-morsi-egypt-second-revolution [http://perma.cc/SMS6-Q8S8]. 
 3 Id. 
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military aid4 despite the regime’s violent repression of mostly 
peaceful Muslim Brotherhood protesters, the United States 
demonstrates that its leaders have still failed to recognize the likely 
origin of September 11. 
A better understanding of the causes underlying terrorist 
violence against the United States may help policy makers resort 
less to military force and more to peaceful, diplomatic approaches.5  
A fairly detailed recounting of the history of Egypt, particularly its 
interface with the West, is required to gain a firmer grasp of the 
challenge that confronts the West generally and the United States in 
particular.  The history of Egypt’s interaction with the West is 
emblematic of the West’s interaction with Islam.  What, 
unfortunately, is usually left out of Western discussions of Islamic 
terrorism is that nearly every Muslim country was colonized by 
Russia6 or Western European nations.7  This colonization had, 
among others, the perverse effects both of thrusting autocratic 
military leaders into power and of galvanizing extremist exponents 
of Islam.  Following colonization, other repressive secular rulers 
arose in Islamic countries including Egypt, leaders who likewise 
sparked an extremist reaction from Islam’s fundamentalist strain.8  
In general, the United States and other Western countries have 
supported these authoritarian secular leaders.  The Arab Spring 
attempted to create a third way, but largely fell victim to entrenched 
 
 4 See id. 
 5 See AUDREY KURTH CRONIN, HOW TERRORISM ENDS: UNDERSTANDING THE 
DECLINE AND DEMISE OF TERRORIST CAMPAIGNS 11 (2009) (“State use of brute force has a 
long history: at some point in the last two centuries, countries in every part of the world—
from Britain to China, Peru to Pakistan, and France to the Philippines—have tried to use 
force to stamp out terrorism at home or abroad, usually unsuccessfully.”). 
 6 See WILLIAM W. COOPER & PIYU YUE, CHALLENGES OF THE MUSLIM WORLD: 
PRESENT, FUTURE AND PAST 228 (2008) (showing Russia colonized six Muslim South 
Asian countries: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan); S.V.R. Nasr, European Colonialism and the Emergence of Modern Nation-
States, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF ISLAM 551, 551 (John L. Esposito ed., 1999), 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/book/islam-9780195107999/islam-9780195 
107999-chapter-13 [http://perma.cc/V5KZ-SZ3R] (discussing Russia’s continuing 
sovereignty over the historically Muslim region of Chechnya). 
 7 THOMAS MICHAEL MCDONNELL, THE UNITED STATES, INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND 
THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM 19–27 (2011) (listing Islamic countries colonized by 
Western European nations). 
 8 See Jane F. Collier, Islamic Law and Western Imperialism, STAN. ELECTRONIC 
HUMAN. REV. (Feb. 15, 1996) (book review), http://web.stanford.edu/group/SHR/5-
1/text/collier.html [http://perma.cc/53MU-5NEJ]. 
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repressive military forces.9 
Faced with the threat of extremist violence, the United States 
and its allies may, however, draw upon revolutionary developments 
in international law since the end of World War II to help fashion a 
sounder counter-terrorism policy and practice.  Part I of this article 
examines the troubling history of Egypt’s encounter with the West.  
Part II discusses United States’ approach to Egypt and to the Middle 
East generally.  Part III reviews the Arab Spring, the Egyptian coup, 
and its aftermath.  Part IV analyzes international law prohibiting 
coups d’état, political repression, colonization, conquest, and 
systematic racial and religious discrimination.  Lastly, Part V 
critiques the United States’ response to the coup and argues that 
Western states and Russia have a moral, if not absolutely legal, 
obligation both (a) to make reparation to all the peoples in the 
Middle East, and to the Islamic world generally and (b) to foster the 
rule of law, human rights, and democratic institutions in all those 
states.  An effective and principled counter-terrorism policy and 
practice require no less.10 
I. Conquest and Colonization of Egypt 
A. Early History 
Egypt had been a Muslim country since 641 CE.11  The army of 
Sultan Selim brought Egypt into the Ottoman Empire after defeating 
the ruling Mamluks outside Cairo in 1517.12  In 1798, Egypt, 
however, was conquered by Napoleon.13  Napoleon’s conquest was 
short-lived; the Ottoman Turks and the British banded together and 
pushed the French out in 1801.14  One of the Turkish officers, 
 
 9 See Ronald Bailey, Why Arab Democracy Will Fail, REASON.COM (Aug. 23, 2013), 
http://reason.com/archives/2013/08/23/why-arab-democracy-will-fail [http://perma.cc/ 
NTR4-ENBZ]. 
 10 Much of the material for Part I of this article is drawn from my book, MCDONNELL, 
supra note 7, at 4–14. 
 11 Walter E. Kaegi, Egypt on the Eve of the Muslim Conquest, in 1 THE CAMBRIDGE 
HISTORY OF EGYPT 34, 61 (Carl F. Petry ed., 1998); see also STANFORD J. SHAW, HISTORY 
OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN TURKEY 152 (1976). 
 12 EMORY C. BOGLE, ISLAM: ORIGIN AND BELIEF 68 (1998); see also CAROLINE 
FINKEL, OSMAN’S DREAM: THE STORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 1300–1923, at 110 (2005). 
 13 See Dan E. Stigall, Iraqi Civil Law: Its Sources, Substance, and Surrendering, 16 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2006). 
 14 Id. 
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Muhammad Ali (also known as Mehemet Ali), became the ruler of 
Egypt.15  He defeated the British in 1807, brutally confiscated the 
lands of rival feudal lords, persuaded the Ottoman Sultan to name 
him viceroy, and, of all Muslim leaders in the nineteenth century, 
did the most to modernize his adopted country along European 
lines.16  He ruthlessly impressed the peasantry into the army and into 
his textile mills.17  He also excluded the Muslim clergy, the ulama, 
from avenues of power.18 
Muhammad Ali gained Egypt’s de facto independence from the 
Ottoman Empire, an independence that displeased Britain.19  One of 
Ali’s military campaigns threatened Constantinople.20  Britain and 
France supported the Ottoman Empire in fending off the attack and 
in defeating Ali.21  Under the terms of the Treaty of London of 1841, 
Ali had to give up Syria, limit his army to 18,000 troops, and ease 
his tariffs on British imports, an act that contributed to the failure of 
his efforts to establish Egyptian manufacturing.22 
Said Pasha, Muhammad Ali’s son, began his nine-year rule in 
1854.23  Wanting to continue the modernization of Egypt, he gave 
 
 15 See id. 
 16 MUHAMMAD SHAFIQ GHURBAL, THE BEGINNINGS OF THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION AND 
THE RISE OF MEHEMET ALI 280, 284 (1977); KAREN ARMSTRONG, ISLAM: A SHORT 
HISTORY 150–51 (2000). 
 17 See Kaegi, supra note 11; SHAW, supra note 11 (discussing Egypt’s history as a 
Muslim country). 
 18 ARTHUR GOLDSCHMIDT JR. & AOMAR BOUM, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE 
EAST 173–74 (8th ed. 2006); JASON GOODWIN, LORDS OF THE HORIZONS: A HISTORY OF 
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 296 (2003). 
 19 J. Rickard, French Invasion of Egypt, 1798–1801, MIL. HIST. ENCYCLOPEDIA ON 
WEB (Jan. 16, 2006), http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_french_egypt.html 
[http://perma.cc/4CKW-TZ5X]. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 GEOFFREY BUTLER & SIMON MACCOBY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 440 (2003).  This Treaty did make Ali’s heirs hereditary rulers, the only viceroys in 
the Ottoman Empire to have gained this privilege.  Id.; see also BOGLE, supra note 12; 
FINKEL, supra note 12; GHURBAL, supra note 16, at 284; ARMSTRONG, supra note 16; 
Lowell N. Lewis, The Period of Muhammad Ali, EGYPTIAN AGRIC., 
http://egyptianagriculture.com/muhammad_ali.html [http://perma.cc/V5DC-8RV2] (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2015).  The Treaty of London of 1841 did make Ali’s heirs hereditary 
rulers, the only viceroys in the Ottoman Empire to have gained this privilege.  BUTLER & 
MACCOBY, supra. 
 23 EDWIN DE LEON, THE KHEDIVE’S EGYPT: THE OLD HOUSE OF BONDAGE UNDER 
NEW MASTERS 98–99 (1877). 
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French diplomat and engineer Ferdinand de Lesseps the concession 
to build the Suez Canal.24  Financed by French, Egyptian, Spanish, 
and neighboring countries’ investors, the de Lesseps’ Suez Canal 
Company started construction.25  Using the forced labor of 
thousands of Egyptian peasants, the Company completed the Canal 
nearly eleven years later at twice the estimated cost.26  When the 
Company ran into financial trouble, Said Pasha bought forty-four 
percent of its stock and also ran the government into debt.27
 
Said’s successor, Ismail spent far beyond his and his country’s 
means, nearly bankrupting Egypt and permitting it to fall largely 
into the hands of French and British creditors.28  In 1875, the dire 
financial situation virtually compelled the government to sell its 
shares in the Canal to Britain.29  The French and English 
governments urged Ismail to abdicate in favor of his son Toufik.30  
When the Ottoman Sultan agreed, Ismail was deposed, and Toufik, 
at 27, became the viceroy of Egypt.31 
Toufik did not reign independently for long.  A charismatic 
officer, Said Ahmed Urabi, led an army revolt in 1881 and became 
the military ruler of the country.32  Urabi set to work wresting 
internal control of Egypt from the French and the British, and called 
for the expulsion of foreigners.33  His policies alarmed the two 
 
 24 Id. 
 25 Jimmy Dunn, Suez Canal, TOUR EGYPT (Aug. 21, 2011), 
http://www.touregypt.net/featurestories/suezcanal.htm [http://perma.cc/U5MY-UET8] 
(discussing construction dates); see also GEORGE BARNETT SMITH, THE LIFE AND 
ENTERPRISES OF FERDINAND DE LESSEPS 126–28 (1893) (describing how the Suez Canal 
was financed). 
 26 See Dunn, supra note 25. 
       27 See DE LEON, supra note 23, at 101–02. 
      28 Id. at 170. 
 29 By 1880, sixty-six percent of Egypt’s revenue went to pay the foreign creditors 
and the tribute to the Sultan-Caliph in Constantinople.  WILLIAM EWART GLADSTONE, THE 
GLADSTONE DIARIES, at lxxi (H.C.G. Matthew ed., 1990); see also JACQUES BERQUE, 
EGYPT: IMPERIALISM AND REVOLUTION 291 (1972). 
 30 Amber Darr, The Khedive’s Escape, EXPRESS TRIBUNE (Mar. 1, 2012), http:// 
tribune.com.pk/story/343507/the-khedives-escape/ [http://perma.cc/M2ZQ-WPAE]. 
 31 Id. 
 32 DONALD FEATHERSTONE, TEL EL-KEBIR 1882: WOLSELEY’S CONQUEST OF EGYPT 
8–9 (1993); DE LEON, supra note 23. 
 33 JOHN SPRINGHALL, DECOLONIZATION SINCE 1945: THE COLLAPSE OF EUROPEAN 
OVERSEAS EMPIRES 88 (2001). 
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European powers.34   
Although initially opposed to the Canal’s construction, the 
British considered the completed Suez Canal vital to their interests 
as “the highway to India.”35  Concerned that Urabi’s revolt might 
threaten their access to the Canal, the British invaded Egypt in 1882, 
beat Urabi’s troops with superior firepower, captured Urabi, and 
reinstated Toufik.36  For the next seventy-two years, the British 
retained de facto if not de jure control of the country.37  Specifically, 
the British occupied Egypt, but permitted the Egyptian viceroy to 
exercise nominal authority.38  At the outbreak of the First World 
War, the British appointed their own sultan of Egypt, establishing a 
protectorate that lasted until shortly after that war.39  After the 
protectorate ended, authority was supposedly passed to Egypt’s 
monarchy (Ali’s heir), but real power lay with the British who 
continued to station large troop contingents in Egypt until 1954.40
 
The colonization of Egypt had practical effects, for example, 
changing a diverse economy into a single commodity 
enterprise.41  Four-fifths of Egyptian cotton now went directly to 
 
 34 LIBRARY OF CONG., EGYPT: A COUNTRY STUDY 428 (Helen Chapin Metz ed., 5th 
ed. 1991). 
 35 Aside from improved communication to India, the Suez Canal opened up much 
more of Africa to European exploitation.  See Richard Brown, European Colonial Rule in 
Africa, in AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 26, 26 (32d ed. 2003); FEATHERSTONE, supra 
note 32. 
 36 See GLADSTONE, supra note 29, at 327.  The canal, which, in the words of one 
commentator, had become “the highway to India.”  FEATHERSTONE, supra note 32, at 7.  
“Almost unselfconscious, because . . . before occupation was decided upon Gladstone 
mentioned the rights ‘of . . . bondholders’ [holders of the Egyptian debt] as on a par with 
those of the Sultan, the Khedive [royal viceroy of Egypt], and the people of Egypt.”  
GLADSTONE, supra note 29, at lxxii (Gladstone himself was a bondholder). 
 37 SPRINGHALL, supra note 33, at 87 (describing the British as a protectorate of Egypt 
during this time period). 
 38 A. P. Thornton, Rivalries in the Mediterranean, The Middle East, and Egypt, in 11 
THE NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY 567, 567–92 (F. H. Hinsley ed., 1962). 
 39 SPRINGHALL, supra note 33, at 87; see also BERQUE, supra note 29, at 263 (“[O]n 
its own authority, [Great Britain] rejected Ottoman sovereignty, dismissed the Khedive, 
[and] imposed its Protectorate unilaterally.”). 
 40 SPRINGHALL, supra note 33; BERNARD REICH, POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE CON-
TEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 190–91 (1990). 
 41 TIMOTHY MITCHELL, COLONISING EGYPT 16 (1991).  Muhammad Ali started the 
shift towards cotton as the main cash crop, but Britain took measures, largely demanding 
a low tariff, which prevented the growth of Egyptian industry.  See BERQUE, supra note 
29. 
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British textile mills.42  Some aspects of European colonization were 
particularly humiliating to Egyptians.  For example, they were 
blatantly discriminated against in employment contracts.43  
Furthermore, under a seventeenth-century agreement between the 
Ottoman Sultan and the French that ultimately applied to all 
Europeans, the Egyptian government had no authority to apply its 
laws to Europeans living in Egypt.44  Known as the Capitulations, 
this set of laws and practices enabled the Europeans to act with 
impunity in committing crimes and civil wrongs.45 
After the First World War, representatives of the Egyptian 
people contested Britain’s holding onto Egypt.46  Several U.S. 
members of Congress and President Woodrow Wilson himself 
criticized colonization and specifically the British colonization of 
that country.47  Britain and France successfully resisted all such 
demands.48  Both the peace treaties between the Allies and Turkey 
(representing the Ottoman Empire) and the League of Nations 
parceled out the Empire mainly between the British and the 
French.49 
 
 42 MITCHELL, supra note 41. 
 43 FERDINAND DE LESSEPS, THE SUEZ CANAL, LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS DESCRIPTIVE 
OF ITS RISE AND PROGRESS IN 1854 TO 1856, at 130–31 (1876). 
 44 1 EARL OF CROMER, MODERN EGYPT 428 (1908) (discussing how treaty 
engagements protect criminality and forbid any quick action against crime). 
 45 See FEATHERSTONE, supra note 32; SPRINGHALL, supra note 33, at 87–88; Brown, 
supra note 35; DE LEON, supra note 23 (discussing Said Ahmed Urabi’s influence on 
Egypt); Dunn, supra note 25 (discussing Said’s purchase and the cost of the canal); 
BERQUE, supra note 29 (discussing the debt before and after the First World War); Laurie 
Milner, The Suez Crisis, BBC (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ 
british/modern/suez_01.shtml [http://perma.cc/69A8-VH89] (noting that in the twentieth 
century the Canal also provided a shorter route to the Persian oil fields). 
        46 See DAVID FROMKIN, A PEACE TO END ALL PEACE: THE FALL OF THE OTTOMAN 
EMPIRE AND THE CREATION OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 391 (1989). 
 47 EREZ MANELA, THE WILSONIAN MOMENT 40 (2007); see also President Woodrow 
Wilson, Address to a Joint Session of Congress on the Conditions of Peace (Jan. 8, 1918) 
(transcript available at www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=65405 
[http://perma.cc/R8FG-VLA9]) (“[O]ther nationalities which are now under Turkish rule 
should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity 
of autonomous development.”). 
 48 See FROMKIN, supra note 46.  To the consternation of Egypt’s revolutionaries, 
however, the United States recognized the British Protectorate in 1919.  MANELA, supra 
note 47, at 147–48. 
 49 See, e.g., Agreement Between Great Britain and France Relating to Article 34 of 
the Peace Treaty of July 24, 1923, Gr. Brit.-Fr., July 24, 1923, 36 L.N.T.S. 208; Treaty of 
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The creation of the mandate system in the former Ottoman 
Empire outraged the Arab population living in many of these 
lands.50  Instead of freedom and self-government, the Arabs 
received another brand of colonial rule.51  Only Turkey had the 
military strength to reject the initial peace Treaty of Sèvres.52  Upon 
Kemal Ataturk’s overthrow of the Ottoman Sultan (the Caliph) 53 
 
and his imposition of secular rule, the Allies agreed to Ataturk’s 
demands to retract the Treaty of Sèvres, thereby expanding 
Turkey’s borders and eliminating the new Armenian state and 
Kurdistan autonomy.54  In his zeal to establish a modern, democratic 
Turkey, Kemel Ataturk also persuaded the Turkish Parliament to 
abolish the Caliphate in 1924.55  Although most Muslims frequently 
disagreed with the Caliph and his practice of bowing to Western 
powers, the abolition of the religious head for Muslims was 
somewhat like abolishing the papacy would be for Catholics.56  The 
abolition caused dismay throughout the Muslim world, leaving 
Muslims feeling adrift.57 
 
Peace with Turkey, Gr. Brit.-Turk., Aug. 10, 1920, 1920 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 11, 
http://treaties.fco.gov.uk/docs/pdf/1920/TS0011.pdf [http://perma.cc/U5P4-PBTT] 
(exemplifying treaty relations, though never adopted and superseded by the Treaty of 
Lausanne); British Mandate for Palestine, July 24, 1922, 3 L.N.O.J. 1007. 
 50 See BERQUE, supra note 29, at 269; WILLIAM L. CLEVELAND, A HISTORY OF THE 
MODERN MIDDLE EAST 163–64 (3d ed. 2000) (“For the Arabs, the aftermath of [World 
War I] produced feelings of bitterness toward the Western powers and a deep-seated 
conviction that they had been betrayed.”).  Note after the First World War, the British 
supported “Syrian unity and Iraqi independence,” but refused to loosen the British grip on 
Egypt.  BERQUE, supra, at 271. 
 51 CLEVELAND, supra note 50, at 161 (“[T]he mandate system was little more than 
nineteenth-century imperialism repackaged to give the appearance of self-
determination.”). 
 52 See GREGORIO F. ZAIDE, WORLD HISTORY IN AN ASIAN SETTING 344 n.5 (1994). 
 53 TOM REISS, THE ORIENTALIST: SOLVING THE MYSTERY OF A STRANGE AND 
DANGEROUS LIFE 117–18 (2006). 
   54 ZAIDE, supra note 52. 
 55 DEBJANI GANGULY & JOHN DOCKER, RETHINKING GANDHI AND NONVIOLENT 
RELATIONALITY 251 (2007). 
 56 See Firas Alkhateeb, The Last Great Caliph: Abdülhamid II, LOST ISLAMIC HIST. 
(Apr. 6, 2013), http://lostislamichistory.com/the-last-great-caliph-abdulhamid-ii/ 
[http://perma.cc/A766-QWAR] (“Throughout Islamic history, one of the uniting aspects 
of the Muslim world was the caliphate.”); IAN RICHARD NETTON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ISLAMIC CIVILISATION AND RELIGION 504 (2008). 
 57 See BERQUE, supra note 29, at 269; CLEVELAND, supra note 50, at 161–64 (“[T]he 
mandate system was little more than nineteenth-century imperialism repackaged to give 
the appearance of self-determination.”); ZAIDE, supra note 52, at 344 (describing Turkey’s 
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Between the two world wars, nationalism in Egypt and much of 
the Middle East was ascendant, but little progress toward ending 
English domination was made.58  Immediately after World War I, 
Britain arrested Egyptian nationalists, violently put down the 
ensuing revolt,59 and rejected their demands for independence.60  
The breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the abolition of the 
Caliphate devastated much of the Arab and Muslim worlds, both 
economically and culturally.61  In a sense, the breakup was like 
creating the European Union in reverse.  What had been a single, 
though somewhat loosely bound, empire, overnight became a group 
of new states (or at least new separately designated colonies or 
protectorates).62  Each of the newly created Arab or Muslim states 
all at once had foreign borders; each had its own customs and 
taxes.63  Former Ottoman Empire provinces that had little to do with 
one another were cobbled together to form a country (for example, 
Iraq was formed from three provinces of the Ottoman Empire—
Mosul, Bagdad, and Basra).64  Others, like Transjordan, were 
created because of squabbles between France and Britain over 
Syria.65  Fragmenting the Ottoman Empire weakened the whole, 
which was France and Britain’s objective.66  Only Turkey’s military 
might and its drastic drive towards modernity enabled it to escape 
 
political strength at the time); REISS, supra note 53; Alkhateeb, supra note 56; GANGULY 
& DOCKER, supra note 55; NETTON, supra note 56; SOLOMON A. NIGOSIA, ISLAM: ITS 
HISTORY, TEACHING, AND PRACTICES 39 (2004) (“The abolition of the Caliphate offended 
Muslims everywhere . . . .”).  But see MAJID KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF 
ISLAM 291 (2006) (noting that Shaykh Ali Abd al-Raziq, one of the ulama of the Azhar 
University and judge of a sharia court, argued in support of a secular state and the abolition 
of the caliphate). 
 58 CLEVELAND, supra note 50, at 193. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See NIGOSIA, supra note 57. 
 62 DONA STEWART, THE MIDDLE EAST TODAY: POLITICAL, GEOGRAPHICAL AND 
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 101–09 (2009). 
 63 Id. (explaining how the British and French divided up the Ottoman Empire); see 
also CAESAR E. FARAH, ISLAM 157 (7th ed. 2003). 
 64 THOMAS X. HAMMES, THE SLING AND THE STONE: ON WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
180 (2006). 
 65 Id. 
 66 STEWART, supra note 62, at 95 (noting that the Allies wanted to ensure that the 
Ottoman Empire would never rise again). 
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the colonial powers’ grasp.67 
The 1936 Anglo-British Treaty, though nominally ending 
British occupation of Egypt,68 allowed Britain to station 10,000 
additional British troops in the Canal Zone.69  “With the advent of 
the Second World War, Britain effectively occupied the country 
again.”70
 
B. The Rise of Nasser—the Secular, Authoritarian Military 
Leader 
As disappointment continued to sweep through the Arab World 
after the Second World War, all parts of the Egyptian population 
were agitating against British rule.71  Although the British had left 
the rest of Egypt largely alone, Britain stationed 80,000 troops in 
the Canal Zone.72  In January 1952, when the British used heavy 
weapons against the light-armed Egyptian police, there was a 
national outcry.73 
 
 67 See NIGOSIA, supra note 57; STEWART, supra note 62 (explaining how the British 
and French divided up the Ottoman Empire); FARAH, supra note 63 (discussing the regions 
which possessed a geographically independent personality before Islam began to assert 
themselves under sectarian adhesion in Islam); HAMMES, supra note 64; Olivier Roy, 
Turkey – A World Apart or Europe’s New Frontier?, in TURKEY TODAY: A EUROPEAN 
COUNTRY? 11 (2004). 
 68 Convention Concerning the Immunities and Privileges to be Enjoyed by the British 
Forces in Egypt art. 4, U.K.-Egypt, opened for signature Aug. 26, 1936, 1937 Gr. Brit. 
T.S. No. 6, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/de/Anglo-Egyptian_ 
Treaty_of_1936.pdf [https://perma.cc/UG5U-JZJJ].  The treaty did provide Egypt a British 
defense guarantee against then fascist Italy.  See P.J. VATIKIOTIS, THE HISTORY OF MODERN 
EGYPT 293 (1991) (expounding on Egyptian rights under the treaty). 
 69 VATIKIOTIS, supra note 68, at 5. 
 70 SPRINGHALL, supra note 33, at 14, 88.  In the British view, the renewed de facto 
colonization of Egypt was justified because of the threat to the canal during the war for 
Allied shipping of supplies, material, and troops.  Id. 
 71 SAMIA MEHREZ, TRANSLATING EGYPT’S REVOLUTION: THE LANGUAGE OF TAHRIR 
22 (2012). 
 72 KEITH KYLE, SUEZ: BRITAIN’S END OF EMPIRE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 40 (2011). 
 73 See C. N. Trueman, The Causes of the Suez Canal War of 1956, HIST. LEARNING 
SITE (May 25, 2015), http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-
to-1980/the-cold-war/the-causes-of-the-suez-canal-war-of-1956causes_suez-crisis-1956. 
htm [http://perma.cc/8VBZ-EHPB].  One Egyptian commentator describes the forces that 
led to the Egyptian Army Revolt of July 23, 1952: “The presence of British troops in the 
Suez Canal Zone [was] widely resented as a national humiliation.”  NEJLA M. ABU 
IZZEDDIN, NASSER OF THE ARABS 5 (1975). 
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This led to the Free Officers’ revolt six months later74 in which 
some young military officers led a revolt against the monarchy and 
Britain.75  All sectors of the population from religious 
fundamentalists to the secularists supported this revolt.76  It 
succeeded.77  Under the treaty of 1954, Britain agreed to leave the 
Canal to the nationalist Egyptian governments.78  Although the 
British left Egypt, the Canal continued to be run by the Suez Canal 
Company, with predominant European ownership.79  After the 
revolt, Gamal Abdul Nasser, one of the Free Officers, became chair 
of the Revolutionary Command Council and later president of 
Egypt.80  Nasser espoused a pan-Arabian ideology, but along secular 
lines.81  Nearly four years to the day after the 1952 revolt, Nasser 
nationalized the Suez Canal.82 
Britain and France reacted immediately and vehemently.83  
Despite Egypt’s offer to pay the European shareholders, the British 
 
 74 See IZZEDDIN, supra note 73, at 5–6 (describing the political and social climate 
when Cairo was burned in 1952). 
 75 See Arab Unity: Nasser’s Revolution, AL JAZEERA (June 20, 2008), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/arabunity/2008/02/200852517252821627.html [http:// 
perma.cc/Z7G2-DJMK] (describing the coup that brought the young Egyptian officials to 
power); Trueman, supra note 73. 
 76 Arab Unity, supra note 75. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Agreement Regarding the Suez Canal Base art. 1, Egypt-U.K., Oct. 19, 1954, 210 
U.N.T.S. 3. 
 79 See The Suez Crisis, 1956, U.S. DEP’T. STATE, https://history.state.gov/milestones/ 
1953-1960/suez [http://perma.cc/2KJF-TLPJ] (last visited Oct. 25, 2015). 
 80 JAMES JANKOWSKI, NASSER’S EGYPT, ARAB NATIONALISM, AND THE UNITED ARAB 
REPUBLIC 19 (2002); Arab Unity, supra note 75. 
 81 Arab Unity, supra note 75. 
 82 See id.; Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Egypt and the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland art. 1, U.K.-
Egypt, Oct. 19, 1954, 210 U.N.T.S. 3 (describing the terms of the Suez Canal Base 
Agreement).  King Farouk left the country to become a playboy on the Riviera.  See 
BERNARD REICH, POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH 
AFRICA 192–93 (1990).  Nasser nationalized the canal one week after the United States 
and Britain withdrew funding for the Aswan Dam.  See Milner, supra note 45.  He said, 
“[T]he Canal will pay for the Dam.”  RAYMOND FLOWER, NAPOLEON TO NASSER: THE 
STORY OF MODERN EGYPT 180 (2001).  Nasser offered to compensate the Canal Company 
shareholders, based on their share value on the French La Bourse, the French Stock 
Exchange, on the day before the nationalization.  On This Day 26 July, 1956: Egypt Seizes 
Suez Canal, BBC (July 26, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/ 
stories/july/26/newsid_2701000/2701603.stm [http://perma.cc/L2WW-D5KA]. 
 83 IZZEDDIN, supra note 73, at 192. 
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and French saw the takeover as robbery of “their” Canal.84  Secretly, 
the French and the English encouraged Israel to invade Egypt and 
promised that they would supply air support and other material.85  
On October 29, 1956, Israel invaded Egypt according to plan, and 
the French and British commenced an extensive bombing campaign 
against Egypt, as agreed.86  The Egyptians initially fought back, but 
later retreated from the Sinai.87  Both the U.S.S.R. and the United 
States opposed the attacks on Egypt.88  On October 30, 1956, the 
United States introduced a resolution in the U.N. Security Council, 
“calling upon all countries to refrain from [using armed] force in the 
Middle East.”89  Both France and Britain vetoed the resolution.90 
After intense pressure from the United States, the U.S.S.R., and 
 
 84 See Arab Unity, supra note 75; IZZEDDIN, supra note 73, at 192 (noting the sense 
of “alarm that the world was on the brink of a major conflict”); DAVID TAL, THE 1956 
WAR: COLLUSION AND RIVALRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 104 (2001) (documenting the 
protracted buildup to the Suez Crisis from the British perspective); Telegram from the 
Delegation at the Suez Canal Conference to the Department of State, U.S. DEP’T STATE, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v16/d104 [https://perma.cc/ 
2YW9-7ZGC].  The British and the French rejected the U.S. proposal that they bring their 
case before the ICJ.  See, e.g., CHARLOTTE PEEVERS, THE POLITICS OF JUSTIFYING FORCE: 
THE SUEZ CRISIS, THE IRAQ WAR, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 103 (2013). 
 85 See Milner, supra note 45.  Given the hostility of Nasser towards Israel, the Israeli 
government participated in the attack in order to overthrow him.  Id. 
 86 See Milner, supra note 45; IZZEDDIN, supra note 73, at 89, 187, 189–90; TAL, supra 
note 84, at 180 (quoting an aide to Israeli General Moshe Dayan observing the French 
bombing of Egyptian military bases, “The camps became an inferno”). 
 87  See IZZEDDIN, supra note 73, at 189. 
 88 The Suez Crisis, 1956, supra note 79. 
 89 Permanent Rep. of the United States to the U.N., Letter dated Oct. 29, 1956 from 
the Rep. of the United States of America addressed to the President of the Security Council 
concerning: “The Palestine Question: Steps for the Immediate Cessation of the Military 
Action of Israel in Egypt,” U.N. Doc. S/3710 (Oct. 30, 1956); see also HUGH THOMAS, 
SUEZ 134 (1967). 
 90 The Veto, SECURITY COUNCIL REP. (Aug. 3, 2015), 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php 
[http://perma.cc/5DBZ-PXMT].  They also vetoed a Soviet resolution calling for a 
ceasefire and for Israel to withdraw from the Sinai.  See also IZZEDDIN, supra note 73, at 
192 (noting the ensuing paralysis of the Security Council and sense of alarm in the U.N. 
General Assembly that resulted from the vetoes). 
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the international community,91
 
France and Britain backed down.92  
The Israeli forces moved back from the Sinai.93 
The two colonial powers lost, and, even though his army was 
defeated, Nasser became a hero in the non-aligned world.94  At least 
one commentator attributes the brisk pace of worldwide 
decolonization after the “Suez Affair” to the success of Nasser in 
nationalizing a primarily European-owned company and to the 
defeat of France and Britain in their attempts to retake the Canal.95
 
In the 1960s, Nasser (and other Arab leaders), increasingly 
made threats to Israel.96  Nasser also took threatening actions.  On 
May 15, 1967, he began to mobilize his military forces and started 
putting them in the Sinai; he asked the U.N. Emergency Force to 
pull out and stop patrolling the Egypt-Israeli border; he closed the 
Straight of Tiran to Israeli ships; and he “talked openly” of attacking 
and destroying Israel.97  Israeli leaders agreed to negotiate, but the 
Arab leaders refused to do so.98  Faced with the provocative 
 
 91 The U.S.S.R. threatened both Britain and Israel; the United States told Britain that 
it would not financially support the pound sterling, which for other reasons had been losing 
value.  Dag Hammarskjöld, the distinguished U.N. Secretary General, offered his 
resignation in protest of the attacks on Egypt.  HALL GARDNER, AMERICAN GLOBAL 
STRATEGY AND THE “WAR ON TERRORISM” 87 (2007). 
 92 See Aron Shai, Suez: The Last Imperial War or an Imperial Hangover?, in THE 
1956 WAR: COLLUSION AND RIVALRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 19, 23 (David Tal ed., 2001). 
 93 Elie Podeh, Regaining Lost Pride: The Impact of the Suez Affair on Egypt and the 
Arab World, in THE 1956 WAR: COLLUSION AND RIVALRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, supra note 
92, at 209, 219.  Israel retained the right of passage through the Straits of Tiran, a right not 
possessed before the attack.  See MILTON VIORST, STORM FROM THE EAST: THE STRUGGLE 
BETWEEN THE ARAB WORLD AND THE CHRISTIAN WEST 105 (2006). 
 94 See Shai, supra note 92 (“Nasser . . . emerged as the Arab world’s mightiest hero, 
having . . . liberated his country from the fetter of imperialism.”). 
 95 IZZEDDIN, supra note 73, at 197; COLE CHRISTIAN KINGSEE, EISENHOWER AND THE 
SUEZ CRISIS OF 1956, at 142 (1995). 
 96 See DEBORAH J. GERNER, ONE LAND, TWO PEOPLES: THE CONFLICT OVER 
PALESTINE 111–12 (1994) (stating that “[t]he [1967] war was preceded by a period of 
increasing tension in the region[]” and detailing Egyptian and Syrian threats made towards 
Israel). 
 97 Id. (arguing Nasser’s actions could fit Lebow’s brinksmanship model); see also L. 
Carl Brown & Richard B. Parker, Introduction to THE SIX-DAY WAR: A RETROSPECTIVE 
1, 7–9 (Richard B. Parker ed., 1996) (noting Nasser concluded he must “respond with some 
military action to deter Israel from attacking”); CHRISTOPHER GELPI, THE POWER OF 
LEGITIMACY 141 (2002) (“[T]he objective will be the destruction of Israel.”). 
 98 The Six-Day War: Background & Overview, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/67_War.html [http://perma.cc/NJ7L-
53KG] (last visited Aug. 29, 2015).  Although agreeing to U.N. mediation of the Israeli 
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language and actions, Israel launched a preemptive attack on June 
5, 1967, conquering Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, taking the Sinai from 
Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank from Jordan.99  The United Nations and the 
commentators generally have agreed that Israel’s preemptive attack 
was justified under international law.100 
 
dispute, Nasser made extremely limited concessions.  GELPI, supra note 97, at 141–
42 (noting Nasser: (1) gave assurances that “Egypt would not begin any military conflict,” 
(2) “would accept U.N. mediation of the dispute with Israel,” (3) “offered to open the 
straits to ships bound for Israel provided that the ships themselves were not Israeli and that 
they carried no strategic materials,” and (4) “suggested that Israel bring the dispute to a 
close by inviting UNEF onto its territory”). 
 99 See GELPI, supra note 97, at 145. 
 100 Although not expressly authorized under article 51 of the UN Charter, a 
preemptive attack is probably justifiable under customary international law 
in narrow circumstances.  The legality of such an attack is usually 
evaluated under the Caroline case, requiring that the preemptive use of 
force “be confined to cases in which the necessity of that self-defense is 
instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment 
for deliberation.”   
Letter from Daniel Webster to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842).  A large body of legal 
scholars believe that Israel was entitled under international law to make a preemptive strike 
because the threat was imminent (“instant” and “overwhelming”) and Israel had exhausted 
all peaceful means to avoid the use of military force.  See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, Clear 
and Present Danger: Enforcing the International Ban on Biological and Chemical 
Weapons Through Sanctions, Use of Force, and Criminalization, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 477, 
491 n.71 (1999) (“Israel pursued alternative means to resolve the conflict . . . [b]ut with 
the Arab leaders issuing increasingly bellicose threats, Israel issued a preemptory strike 
against the Egyptian airfields.”); WILLIAM V. O’BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND 
LIMITED WAR 133 (1981) (arguing Israel’s preemptory strike against Egypt as justified); 
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 85 (4th ed. 2006) (recognizing Israel’s 
preemptory strike on June 5, 1967 as justified); ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION: A 
KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS 82 (2007) (justifying Israel’s preemptive attack on June 5, 
1967); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 192 (4th ed. 2005) 
(arguing that Israel’s attack on June 5, 1967 on Egypt was justified).  But see Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63 U. PITT. L REV. 889, 894 n.33 (2002) 
(“Subsequent evidence suggests that Israel knew Egypt did not plan to attack 
Israel . . . [and] [i]f so, Israel’s attack was unlawful.”).  U.N. Security Council Resolution 
242, however, calls upon Israel to return occupied territories, on the one hand, and Arab 
states to recognize and guarantee the security of Israel, on the other.  S.C. Res. 242 (Nov. 
22, 1967), http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/ 7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136 
[http://perma.cc/E758-E3QU] (“The Security Council . . . 1. Affirms that the fulfilment of 
Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East 
which should include the application of both the following principles: (i) Withdrawal of 
Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; (ii) Termination of all 
claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to 
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C. The Rise of al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood 
The British colonization of Egypt had provoked not only secular 
Egyptian nationalists, but also Islamic fundamentalists.101  In 1919, 
the then-thirteen-year-old Hasan al-Banna participated in the 
Egyptian uprising against the British.102  He grew to become a 
religious and nationalist leader.103  The First World War and its 
aftermath affected al-Banna and helped create the movement he 
led:104 
After the World War I, Turkey abandoned the Caliphate, 
discarded the Arabic alphabet, and carried out extensive reforms.  
These things had profound repercussions in Egypt.  The Liberals 
seized this opportunity to issue literature on Egypt’s relations with 
the West, the substitution of the Western hat for the fez, the 
emancipation of women, freedom of thought, and the like.  On the 
other hand, the Conservatives held these to be a departure from 
the fold of Islam, the message of the Koran, the name of the 
Caliphate, and religion in its totality.  It was their opinion that 
Egypt had become the headquarters of the Islamic mission, the 
field of its struggle, and the legal heir of its leadership.  Al-Banna 
was among those of the latter party.105 
In 1928, in Ismailia, Egypt, al-Banna founded the Muslim 
Brotherhood.106  A gifted speaker and organizer, al-Banna built the 
 
live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of 
force . . . .”). 
 101 See Profile: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, BBC (Dec. 25, 2013), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12313405 [http://perma.cc /6GKY-LGM4]. 
 102 MUSA HUSAINI, THE MOSLEM BRETHREN 5 (1955). 
 103 See id. at 42–44 (discussing the various religious and nationalist principles of the 
Muslim Brotherhood). 
 104 Id. at 5. 
 105 Id. (“Mustafa Kemal [Ataturk] . . . had announced the abolition of the Caliphate 
and separated the state from religion in a country which was until recently the site of the 
Commander of the Faithful [Amir al-Mu’minin].  The Turkish government proceeded 
rashly and blindly in this direction in all spheres of life . . . I saw the social life of the 
beloved Egyptian people, oscillating between her dear and precious Islam which she had 
inherited, defended, lived with during fourteen centuries, and this severe Western invasion 
which was armed and equipped with all destructive influences of money, wealth, prestige, 
ostentation, power and means of propaganda.” (emphasis added)); MANUS I. MIDLARSKY, 
ORIGINS OF POLITICAL EXTREMISM: MASS VIOLENCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND 
BEYOND 17 n.46 (2011) (citing BRYNAR LIA, THE SOCIETY OF THE MOSLEM BROTHERS IN 
EGYPT 1928–1942, at 28 (1998)). 
 106 The group formed under the name, “Association of the Moslem Brethren.”  
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society into one of the most formidable organizations in Egypt, if 
not the Arab world.107  At its height, in the 1940s, the Muslim 
Brotherhood had over 500,000 registered members.108  The 
Brotherhood ran schools, health clinics, religious classes, other 
services, and also developed a clandestine military arm.109 
In 1948, five weeks after declaring the Muslim Brotherhood 
illegal, the Egyptian prime minister was assassinated by a Muslim 
Brotherhood member.110  This murder led to the assassination of the 
forty-three-year-old al-Banna the following year, probably by an 
Egyptian government agent.111
 
The Muslim Brotherhood was the forerunner of those 
contemporary Arab-Muslim groups, including al-Qaeda and ISIS, 
which have targeted the West for violence.112  After al-Banna’s 
assassination, Sayyid al-Qutb became the Brotherhood’s 
philosophical and theological prophet as well as one of the 
organization’s leaders.113  A skilled writer and deep thinker, al-Qutb 
went far beyond al-Banna and called not only for a Muslim state 
and for the recovery of all territory once under Muslim control, but 
also for world conquest and the imposition of Islam as the official 
world government and as the sole religion for all peoples of the 
world.114  After studying for a postgraduate degree at Colorado State 
College of Education (now University of Northern Colorado) from 
1948 to 1951, al-Qutb returned to Egypt with a special antipathy 
towards the United States, its culture, and its people.115 
 
HUSAINI, supra note 102, at 1–2. 
 107 See Profile: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, supra note 101. 
 108 HUSAINI, supra note 102, at 18. 
 109 See CHRISTINE S. RINEHART, VOLATILE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE ORIGINS OF 
TERRORISM: THE RADICALIZATION 29 (2013).  The Brotherhood’s popularity is probably 
due both to its opposition to foreign control and to the fact that it provides a “safety net” 
via charitable and social programs.  See DINA SHEHATA, ISLAMISTS AND SECULARISTS IN 
EGYPT: OPPOSITION, CONFLICT, AND COOPERATION 54 (2010) (“[T]he social services and 
charitable activities provided by the Brotherhood helped create social safety net at a time 
of economic retrenchment.”). 
 110 RINEHART, supra note 109, at 23. 
         111 See YOUSSEF M. CHOUEIRI, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 59 (3d ed. 2010). 
 112 MCDONNELL, supra note 7, at 11. 
         113 See CHOUEIRI, supra note 111, at 62. 
         114 See DAVID BUKAY, FROM MUHAMMAD TO BIN LADEN 215–16 (2007). 
 115 See STEWART, supra note 62, at 176–78.  Qutb’s dislike of the United States can 
probably be attributed to his perception that Americans had reacted “triumphant[ly]” to 
Israel’s independence and to Americans’ “jubilant” response to Hasan al-Banna’s 
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Al-Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood had crossed paths with 
the new government since the Free Officers’ successful liberation 
of Egypt from Britain in 1952.116  Although initially supporting the 
government, the Muslim Brotherhood soon stood at odds with 
Nasser’s secular state.117  Some members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood engaged in violence against state officials, including at 
least one assassination attempt against Nasser in 1954, which led to 
the Brotherhood’s “forcible suppression.”118  Although al-Qutb did 
not directly take part in such violence, he was tortured and 
imprisoned for many years.119  He was subsequently accused of 
plotting against the State and against its president.120  Nasser had 
him executed in 1966, elevating al-Qutb to martyrdom status in the 
eyes of Islamic fundamentalists.121  Al-Qutb’s philosophical 
writings have become the holy writ of today’s Muslim 
fundamentalist movements.122  He is said to have inspired Osama 
bin Laden 123 and Ayman al-Zawahiri.124 
Up until 1967, most Muslims looked up to Nasser and admired 
his pan-Arab nationalism, and his apparent modernization of 
 
assassination.  See JAMES TOTH, SAYYID QUTB: THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF A RADICAL 
ISLAMIC INTELLECTUAL 65 (2013) (noting that Outb’s “American sojourn” made him an 
“extreme radical”).  He was also apparently distressed by the “seductive atmosphere” in 
the United States upon seeing girls and boys dancing closely together at a church social.  
Id. 
 116 Profile: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, supra note 101. 
 117 See id. 
 118 Muslim Brotherhood, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/ 
Muslim-Brotherhood [http://perma.cc/T7DW-JXHB] (last updated Nov. 24, 2014). 
 119 See RICHARD RUBENSTEIN, JIHAD AND GENOCIDE 18–19 (2010). 
 120 Id. at 18. 
 121 Id. at 18–19. 
 122 Id. at 18. 
 123 See RICHARD C. MARTIN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM WORLD 108 
(2004) (observing that Osama bin Laden was taught by Muhammad Qutb, Sayyid Qutb’s 
brother); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 119, at 19–20 (noting the power of al-Qutb’s choosing 
death rather than compromising his beliefs). 
 124 See MARTIN, supra note 123.  Al-Qutb heavily influenced Ayman Zawahiri as 
well.  See CLARK MCCAULEY & SOPHIA MOSKALENKO, FRICTION: HOW RADICALIZATION 
HAPPENS TO THEM AND US 30 (2011) (noting Zawahiri’s uncle was Qutb’s lawyer); 
RUBENSTEIN, supra note 119, at 19–20. 
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Egypt.125  Islamic fundamentalists held relatively little power.126  
The Israeli success in the 1967 War (also called the Six Day War), 
however, had a devastating impact on the secular Arab 
governments.127  They were discredited in the eyes of their people.128  
Because of the failure of these governments vis-à-vis Israel, 
domestically, the pendulum began to swing away from the secular 
modernizing governments epitomized by Nasser, and by the Shah 
of Iran, to the “conservative” Muslim fundamentalists, epitomized 
by the Muslim Brotherhood.129  There is a competition going on in 
the Islamic world between the “conservative” fundamentalists and 
the “liberal” modern secularists.130  From 1967 to 2011, we probably 
witnessed the rise of fundamentalism in the Muslim world, with the 
possible exception of Iran.131  There, actual experience of living 
under an Islamic state fueled an active opposition, which, has not 
yet become strong enough to displace the mullahs.132  The Arab 
 
 125 See David S. Sorenson, The Dynamics of Political Dissent in Egypt, 27 FLETCHER 
F. WORLD AFF. 207, 212 (2003). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. (“[T]he appeal of political Islam grew after the disastrous Egyptian defeat in 
the 1967 war.”); see also ARMSTRONG, supra note 16, at 171 (“People felt that the Muslims 
had failed because they had not been true to their religion.”); LOREN D. LYBARGER, 
IDENTITY AND RELIGION IN PALESTINE: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN ISLAMISM AND 
SECULARISM IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES 23–25 (2007) (noting that Nasser’s 
humiliating defeat led to the reconstruction of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine); 
Gérard Chaliand, From 1968 to Radical Islam, in THE HISTORY OF TERRORISM FROM 
ANTIQUITY TO AL QAEDA 221, 225, 240–41, 245 (2007) (“The victory of 1967 had been 
unqualified, the humiliation of the Arab states complete.”). 
 129 See VATIKIOTIS, supra note 68, at 420–21 (“In fact, inter-communal conflict began 
to gather momentum soon after the military debacle of June 1967.  It was, in a sense, one 
of the inevitable consequences of the disappointment with and the insecurity felt under the 
Nasser regime.  There was steady proliferation of militant religious organizations in both 
the Muslim and Coptic communities, especially among university students.  This process 
of militant religious resurgence was accelerated by Nasser’s failing socialist policies 
followed by Sadat’s pro-Western economic liberalization [policy and his alliance with 
rich, conservative oil-producing Arab states after 1971].  A suitable climate for religious 
militancy was created by both leaders, especially Sadat.”). 
 130 MCDONNELL, supra note 7, at 12. 
 131 Id. 
 132 See Joby Warrick & Julie Tate, High-Priced Advocacy Raises Questions for 
Supporters of Iranian Exile Group, WASH. POST (July 5, 2012), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/high-priced-advocacy-raises-questions-for-
supporters-of-iranian-exile-group/2012/07/05/gJQABoacQW_story.html [https://perma. 
cc/AGB8-2Y56]; Eric Shawn, Iran Resistance Leader Predicts Regime Change in 
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Spring, however, may have signaled a return to the rise of 
secularism in the Arab and Muslim worlds.133  “Conservative” 
fundamentalists, have been strengthened by internal domestic 
policies of Islamic states.134  Nasser, for example, ruled with an iron 
fist, imprisoning political opponents, torturing them and, in some 
cases, executing them.135  He took repressive measures against the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which had opposed his secularizing of 
Egyptian society.136 
D.   Anwar al-Sadat 
Following Nasser’s unexpected death in 1970, Vice President 
Anwar al-Sadat, one of the original “Free Officers” in the war of 
independence, took office on an interim basis and then consolidated 
his control by purging political rivals.137  He is most noted for three 
things: his attack on Israel on Yom Kippur in 1973, his trip to 
Jerusalem in 1977, and his agreeing to the Camp David Accords in 
1979.138  The attack on Yom Kippur caught the Israelis off guard.139  
The Egyptians initially retook large portions of the western Sinai.140  
The United States soon provided military supplies to Israel, 
including tanks and other weapons, helping Israel retake the 
 
Exclusive Fox News Interview, FOX NEWS (June 27, 2014), http:// 
www.foxnews.com/world/2014/06/27/iran-resistance-leader-predicts-regime-change-in-
exclusive-fox-news-interview/ [http://perma.cc/ZFT3-APAM] (describing the failed 
attempts of the Peoples’ Mujahdin Organization of Iran (MEK) to remove the mullahs). 
 133 JUAN COLE, THE NEW ARABS: HOW THE MILLENNIAL GENERATION IS CHANGING 
THE MIDDLE EAST, at x–xii (2014).  One colleague notes, however, that except for Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, most Arabs were secular, even before the Arab Spring.  Comments of 
Professor Sahar Aziz (2015) (on file with author).  She stated that Arabs were not 
becoming more secular but instead wanted a more liberal, democratic government.  Id. 
 134 MCDONNELL, supra note 7, at 12. 
 135 Id. 
 136 JOHN L. ESPOSITO & JOHN  O. VOLL, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 174 (1996). 
 137 Eric Pace, Anwar el-Sadat, the Daring Arab Pioneer of Peace with Israel: Sadat’s 
Innovations Sprang from His Courage and Flexibility, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 1981), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/1981/10/07/obituaries/anwar-el-sadat-daring-arab-pioneer-peace-with 
-israel-sadat-s-innovations-sprang.html?pagewanted=all [http://perma.cc/9X7F-VUG4]; 
see also VATIKIOTIS, supra note 68, at 414–15. 
 138 See Pace, supra note 137. 
 139 See generally ARYEH SHALEV, ISRAEL’S INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT BEFORE THE 
YOM KIPPUR WAR: DISENTANGLING DECEPTION AND DISTRACTION (2010) (examining gaps 
in Israeli intelligence and Israel’s immediate and long-term responses). 
 140 See id. at 31–32 (contrasting Egypt’s success in first two days of war with 
subsequent reversal). 
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Sinai.141  These efforts led directly to the Arab oil boycott of 1973.142  
Yet Egypt’s initial success probably enabled Sadat to go to 
Jerusalem and to agree to the Camp David Accords.143 
The relative “openness” under Sadat allowed the Muslim 
Brotherhood to reestablish itself.144  Sadat, however, imprisoned 
and, in some cases, tortured extremists from both the left and the 
right.145  In 1981, he arrested “over 1,500 religious militants,” a 
move that outraged the fundamentalist opposition.146  Although 
generally popular in Egypt, Sadat had been reviled by Muslim 
fundamentalists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad (“al Jihad”), and the Gamaa al Islamiya (“GIA”).147  At this 
time, al Jihad and GIA “broke from the Muslim Brotherhood, 
specifically because the Brotherhood had now refused to consider 
the use of violence.”148  These Islamic fundamentalist organizations 
 
 141 Memorandum of Conversation between Henry A. Kissinger, U.S. Sec’y of State, 
and Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the United States, in the Map Room of the White 
House (Oct. 9, 1973) (transcript available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/ 
NSAEBB98/octwar-21b.pdf [http://perma.cc/5HXP-BT73]).  
 142 James K. Hickel, The Role of Expropriation in the Formation of the OPEC Cartel, 
2 ENERGY L.J. 107 (1981). 
 143 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICA 340 (Anthony Appiah & Henry Louis Gates eds., 
2010). 
 144 See ABDULLAH AL-ARIAN, ANSWERING THE CALL: POPULAR ISLAMIC ACTIVISM IN 
EGYPT 9 (2014); Michele Dunne et al., Egypt – Don’t Give up on Democracy Promotion, 
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, June 2007, at 1, 4 (“President Anwar Al Sadat 
reinstitutes limited pluralism, allowing the creation of a few loyal opposition parties and 
the reactivation of the Muslim Brotherhood.”); Müge Aknur, The Muslim Brotherhood in 
Politics in Egypt: From Moderation to Authoritarianism?, 9 REV. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 7 
(2013) (“A new era started for the Muslim Brotherhood when Nasser’s successor, 
President Anwar Sadat, encouraged the Islamists in order to counterbalance secular 
opposition from Nasserist, Marxist, and nationalist circles . . . [and] strengthened political 
Islam in Egypt, releasing hundreds of members of the organization and other political 
prisoners.”). 
 145 See Caroline Goerzig, Egypt’s Gama’a Islamiya: Change Through Debate?, in 
ENGAGING EXTREMISTS: TRADE-OFFS, TIMING, AND DIPLOMACY 203, 207–11 (I. William 
Zartman & Guy Oliver Faure eds., 2011); KEVIN DWYER, ARAB VOICES: THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS DEBATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST 61 (1991).  
 146 See VATIKIOTIS, supra note 68, at 420, 424. 
 147 See MATHIEU GUIDÈRE, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 
88–89, 103–04 (2012).  GIA and al Jihad were formed by “dissident” groups of “former 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood.”  Id.  GIA was one of the foundational groups 
forming al-Qaeda; al Jihad merged with al-Qaeda in 2001.  Id. 
 148 KRISTA E. WIEGAND, BOMBS AND BALLOTS: GOVERNANCE BY ISLAMIST TERRORIST 
AND GUERRILLA GROUPS 1–2 (2010); see also Goerzig, supra note 145, at 207 (“Feeling 
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“could not forgive [Sadat] for recognizing Israel or for his role in 
the trial and execution of their ideological prophet, al-Qutb, for 
whom Anwar Sadat was one of the judges who ordered al-Qutb’s 
execution.149  An assassin closely linked to the GIA and al 
Jihad later led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, killed Anwar Sadat at a 
parade on October 6, 1981.150 
“[I]mplicated in the Sadat assassination,”151  two Egyptians later 
came to Peshawar, Afghanistan, to struggle against the Soviet 
occupation there.152  These men were the blind cleric Omar Abdel 
Rahman and Ayman al Zawahiri, who later became bin Laden’s top 
lieutenant153 and is now the head of al-Qaeda.154  Al Zawahiri was 
arrested at the age of fifteen for being a member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood; Rahman was the spiritual leader of those members of 
al Jihad that carried out the assassination of Sadat.155  Rahman 
ultimately immigrated to the United States and planned the 1993 
World Trade Center bombing.156  Zawahiri was tortured for his 
alleged complicity in the Sadat assassination.157  Lawrence Wright 
notes that the seeds for 9/11 may very well have been sown in 
Egypt’s torture chambers.158 
 
that the Brotherhood had achieved little in all its years, Gama’a Islamiya eventually 
rejected the Brothers’ accommodating path and decided that the way to achieve an Islamic 
state was through a revolutionary Islamic mass movement.”). 
 149 See DAVID SAGIV, FUNDAMENTALISM AND INTELLECTUALS IN EGYPT 6 (1995). 
 150 See Mohamed Fahmy, 30 Years Later, Questions Remain over Sadat Killing, 
Peace with Israel, CNN (Oct. 6, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/06/ 
world/meast/egypt-sadat-assassination [http:// perma.cc/K24S-Y6WD]. 
 151 RICHARD BERNSTEIN, OUT OF THE BLUE 16 (2002). 
 152 Id.; see also Lawrence Wright, The Man Behind bin Laden, NEW YORKER, Sept. 
16, 2002, at 56, 58; PETER TOMSEN, THE WARS OF AFGHANISTAN: MESSIANIC TERRORISM, 
TRIBAL CONFLICTS, AND THE FAILURE OF GREAT POWERS (2013). 
 153 See Wright, supra note 152. 
 154 Al-Qaeda’s Remaining Leaders, BBC (June 16, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
world-south-asia-11489337 [http://perma.cc/8YV9-TTWE]. 
 155 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 151 (citing Rahman’s fatwa calling for Sadat’s 
assassination). 
 156 Id.; see also 1993 World Trade Center Bombing Fast Facts, CNN (Feb. 13, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/05/us/1993-world-trade-center-bombing-fast-facts [http:// 
perma.cc/FVX8-5JKH]. 
 157 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 151, at 39–40 (citing video footage from Zawahiri’s 
trial); Brian Till, A Note on Egyptian Torture, ATLANTIC (Feb. 11, 2011) http://www. 
theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/02/a-note-on-egyptian-torture/70476 [http:// 
perma.cc/6WBU-T7QV]. 
 158 LAWRENCE WRIGHT, THE LOOMING TOWER 52 (2007); see also AL-ARIAN, supra 
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II. The United States, Egypt, and the Middle East 
A. The United States Assumes the Mantle of a Colonial 
Power. 
The United States never colonized a Muslim nation.159  But it 
gradually assumed—at least for Muslims—the mantle of 
colonization over the Middle East, particularly after the Second 
World War.160  The United States showed relatively little interest in 
the Middle East until American oil executives discovered oil in 
Bahrain and Kuwait in the 1930s.161  From the end of the Second 
World War to the end of the Cold War in 1990, the concerns that 
drove United States’ policies in the Middle East region included 
ensuring the supply of oil, supporting Israel,162 and containing 
communism.163  To guarantee that oil is readily available,164 the 
 
note 144, at 92 (noting that Nasser brutally tortured Muslim Brotherhood members). 
 159 See Nasr, supra note 6, at 551–58 (omitting mention of any U.S. colonization). 
 160 See Toby Craig Jones, America, Oil, and War in the Middle East, 99 J. AM. HIST. 
208, 211–12 (2012) (discussing U.S. support for autocratic leaders such as the shah in 
Iran). 
 161 Id. at 208; Yasumasa Kuroda, Bush’s New World Order: A Structural Analysis of 
Stability and Conflict in the Gulf, in THE GULF WAR AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER 52, 59–
60 (Tareq Y. Ismael & Jacqueline Ismael eds., 1995). 
 162 Jones, supra note 160, at 208.  Muslims were not the only parties in the Middle 
East who suffered from conquest, colonization, and discrimination.  The United States’ 
policy toward Israel stems in part from Russia’s and the Christian West’s attitudes and 
conduct toward the Jewish people.  The Christian West has practiced systematic 
discrimination against Jews for over 2000 years (and the Russians have done so for at least 
a millennium).  A full discussion of the West’s invidious and genocidal discrimination 
against the Jewish people as well as the creation of the modern state of Israel is beyond the 
scope of this article.  For an enumeration of discriminatory and genocidal treatment of the 
Jews throughout history, see MCDONNELL, supra note 7, at 14–16 (documenting the 
historical persecution of Jews). 
 163 2 JOSEPH R. CONLIN, THE AMERICAN PAST: A SURVEY OF AMERICAN HISTORY 756 
(10th ed. 2014). 
 164 Since the late 1970s, U.S. dependence has generally fluctuated between 30 and 
49%, exceeding 60% in 2007 and declining to 49% in 2010; it dipped below 30% in the 
early 1980s.  NEELISH NERUKAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41765, U.S. OIL IMPORTS: 
CONTEXT AND CONSIDERATIONS 1 (2011); see also How Much Petroleum Does the United 
States Import and From Where?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?Id=727&t=6 [http://perma.cc/Z8LN-4Q36] (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2015) (“Net imports accounted for 27% of the petroleum consumed in the 
United States, the lowest annual average since 1985.”).  Despite the last few years, the 
trend of the United States depending on foreign oil remains significant.  Because oil is 
critical to the U.S. economy, U.S. foreign policy for decades has been geared to ensuring 
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United States has supported authoritarian regimes in the Arab 
world, including the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia, the Shah of 
Iran,165  Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and, initially, Saddam Hussein in 
Iraq, not to mention autocratic leaders of the tiny, oil-rich Gulf 
states166—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates.167  For most of its history, the United States has been 
indifferent to the plight of Arab and Muslim peoples living in these 
countries, to their economic difficulties, and to the human rights 
deprivations they have had to bear.168 
 
a readily available supply of oil.  See generally STEPHEN J. RANDALL, UNITED STATES 
FOREIGN OIL POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR I: FOR PROFITS AND SECURITY 38, 152–53 (2005) 
(noting “the formulation of United States petroleum policy during World War II”). 
 165 DAVID HARRIS, THE CRISIS: THE PRESIDENT, THE PROPHET, AND THE SHAH-1979 
AND THE COMING OF MILITANT ISLAM 23, 47–48 (2004) (explaining how, significantly, the 
Shah’s father, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was supported by the United States). 
 166 MCDONNELL, supra note 7, at 14. 
 167 See Nader Hashemi, The Arab Spring, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the Question of 
Democracy in the Middle East, 41 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 31, 35–36 (2012); Ved 
Nanda, Arab Spring, the Responsibility to Protect, and the U.S. Foreign Policy—Some 
Preliminary Thoughts, 41 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 7, 12 (2012) (describing the 
resolution of Israel’s strike against the Gaza strip through an American diplomatic push).  
See generally 2013 U.S. DEP’T STATE U.A.E. HUM. RTS. REP., http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/220592.pdf [https://perma.cc/CRK8-UMMJ] (describing United 
Arab Emirates’ human rights report for 2013); 2013 U.S. DEP’T STATE BAHR. HUM. RTS. 
REP., http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220560.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EXL-
5LDS] (describing Bahrain’s human rights report for 2013); Qatar U.N. Review: Crucial 
Reforms Needed to Protect Women and Migrant Workers, AMNESTY INT’L (May 7, 2014), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/05/qatar-un-review-crucial-reforms-needed 
-protect-women-and-migrant-workers/ [http://perma.cc/5S5H-624W] (describing Qatar’s 
U.N. Review and the country’s need to protect women against domestic violence and 
migrant workers’ rights); Annual Report 2012, Kuwait, AMNESTY INT’L (May 23, 2013) 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-kuwait-2013 [http://perma.cc/ 
F5ER-LV2V] (describing Kuwait’s discrimination towards women and migrant workers); 
FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 18–23 (2014), https://freedomhouse.org/ 
sites/default/files/Freedom%20in%20the%20World%202014%20Booklet.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/A93N-8LN2] (rating the four small Gulf States “not free,” except for Kuwait, 
which earned a “part free” rating).  On U.S. dependence on Arab oil, see GAD G. GILBAR, 
THE MIDDLE EAST OIL DECADE AND BEYOND 52–53 (1997) (noting the significant effect 
of petroleum on U.S. foreign policy decisions). 
 168 MCDONNELL, supra note 7, at 14.  Some commentators note “[t]he tragedy of 
U.S.–Middle East policy is that the United States has not been celebrated for its selfless 
devotion to democracy, but rather it has been bitterly criticized for not showing the 
slightest commitment to democracy whether [that be] in Turkey, Iran,” or other Arab and 
non-Arab Middle Eastern countries “with the sole exception of Israel.”  ANDREW ROSS & 
KRISTIN ROSS, ANTI-AMERICANISM 115 (2004); see also MARWAN BISHARA, THE 
INVISIBLE ARAB: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF THE ARAB REVOLUTIONS 42 (2012) 
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B. The Perceived Communist Threat 
From the onset of the Cold War, the United States had been 
determined to stem the tide of communism.169  In this fierce clash, 
the United States moved aggressively to ensure that the Soviet 
Union would not extend its influence in the Middle East.170  “Among 
other things, the United States engineered the coup in 1953 against 
the elected Prime Minister of Iran, Muhammad Mossadegh, because 
of largely unsupported claims that he was leaning towards the 
communists.171  In 1963, the CIA again engineered a coup in Iraq, 
ousting communist-leaning General Abdel Karim Kassem and 
putting in his place Abu Salam Arif of the Ba’ath Party in 1963.172  
That ouster ultimately led to Saddam Hussein taking control of the 
country.173 
When the United States refused to finance the Aswan Dam 
because Nasser had purchased military equipment from 
Czechoslovakia—then a Soviet satellite—Nasser turned to the 
U.S.S.R.174 Nasser’s turn to the communist bloc led the United 
States to work against him.175 
The Islamic revolution in Iran upset the order that the United 
States helped establish.176  The U.S. support for Saddam Hussein’s 
war against Iran can be seen, to a certain extent, to fall within this 
context.177  The next major cleavage arose when Saddam Hussein 
invaded Kuwait.  No longer considered a reliable U.S. partner, 
Saddam Hussein was attacked by a broad coalition led by the United 
 
(discussing petrodollar subsidization of Arab government despotism). 
 169 See ROSS & ROSS, supra note 168. 
 170 CONLIN, supra note 163. 
 171 See STEPHEN KINZER, OVERTHROW: AMERICA’S CENTURY OF REGIME CHANGE 
FROM HAWAII TO IRAQ 122 (2006). 
 172 CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MILITARISM, SECRECY, AND THE 
END OF THE REPUBLIC 223 (2004). 
 173 Id. at 224. 
 174 Not coincidentally, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal exactly one week after the 
U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told him that the United States was withdrawing 
financial support for the Aswan Dam.  See Milner, supra note 45, at 3.  At the same time 
the World Bank withdrew its pledge of $200 million.  Id. 
 175 See The Suez Crisis, 1956, supra note 79; Milner, supra note 45 (discussing the 
backlash that occurred because of the communist bloc’s involvement). 
 176 See Krysta Wise, Islamic Revolution of 1979: The Downfall of American-Iranian 
Relations, 11 LEGACY 1, 1 (2011). 
 177 S.C. Res. 660, ¶ 19 (Aug. 2, 1990) (condemning the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq). 
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States.178  Significantly, the repressive House of Saud requested that 
the United States post standing troops in Saudi Arabia as a 
protection force against Iraq.  At one point, half a million U.S. 
troops were stationed on the ground in the country containing the 
two holiest places in Islam, Mecca and Medina.179 
All these policies and practices of the United States were not 
lost on Arabs and Muslims.  With the end of the Cold War, the 
counterweight to the United States, Russia, was a far less significant 
presence in the Middle East than the former Soviet Union had 
been.180  The United States had now taken the step of actually 
stationing troops in the holiest land of Islam.181  Osama bin Laden’s 
first fatwa, in 1996, was entitled, “Declaration of Jihad against the 
Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.”182  The 
invasion of Afghanistan, and even more importantly the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, further underscored, in Muslim eyes, the United 
 
 178 Jones, supra note 160, at 216.   
 179 Toby Jones, Shifting Sands: The Future of U.S.–Saudi Relations, 85 FOREIGN AFF. 
164, 166 (2006). 
 180 See P.J. VATIKIOTIS, MIDDLE EAST, FROM THE END OF EMPIRE TO THE END OF THE 
COLD WAR 54 (1997) (discussing the European community and union). 
 181 U.S. Pulls out of Saudi Arabia, BBC (Apr. 29, 2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 
2/hi/middle_east/2984547.stm [http://perma.cc/A2H6-E5MM]. 
 182  See Bin Laden’s Fatwa, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 23, 1996), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/military-july-dec96-fatwa_1996 [http://perma.cc/ 
2MDZ-AMB9].  Reading Osama bin Laden’s writings, one gets the clear impression that 
his holy war against the United States and against all Americans was triggered more by 
the stationing of troops in Saudi Arabia than by U.S. support of Israel; he does, however, 
characterize the “enemy” as the “American-Israeli alliance.”  MCDONNELL, supra note 7, 
at 16.  The British support of Abdul Aziz ibn-Saud during World War I likewise helped 
him emerge as the ruler of Saudi Arabia.  SCOTT ANDERSON, LAWRENCE IN ARABIA: WAR, 
DECEIT, IMPERIAL FOLLY AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 165 (2013).  
Thomas Edward Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia) argued that despite posing as Islamic 
reformists “‘with all the narrow minded bigotry of the puritan,’ ibn-Saud and his 
Wahhabists were hardly representative of Islam [but] . . . marginal medievalists, ‘and if it 
prevailed, we would have in place of the tolerant, rather comfortable Islam of Mecca and 
Damascus, the fanaticism of Nejd . . . intensified and swollen by success.’”  Id. at 173.  
Because of their oil wealth, the House of Saud has helped Wahhabism spread throughout 
the world and has contributed both to the growth of al-Qaeda and ISIS.  See Yousaf Butt, 
How Saudi Wahhabism Is the Fountainhead of Islamist Terrorism, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 
20, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-yousaf-butt-/saudi-wahhabism-islam-
terrorism_b_6501916.html [https://perma.cc/9VSX-YNDW] (“The fight against ISIS and 
Al-Qaeda is deeply ironic since these organizations were created and are sustained, in part, 
by funds we hand over to the Saudis and Gulf Arab nations to purchase their oil.”).  
Lawrence has proved to be prescient. 
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States assuming the familiar role of Western colonial overlord.183  
Query whether the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and other U.S. 
counter-terrorism policies and practices contributed to the rise of 
ISIS. 
III.  The Arab Spring, the Military Coup d’État, and the 
Following Repression 
A. The Disappointing Outcome of the Arab Spring 
The Arab Spring swept through the Middle East on January 25, 
2011, sparked by the self-immolation of a young street vendor fed 
up with both the harshness and pettiness of the Tunisian largely one 
party regime.184  The ensuing massive protest unexpectedly resulted 
in the Tunisian military dictator falling.185  Egypt, Libya, Syria, 
Bahrain, and Yemen followed, with massive protests of their own.186  
Led by young secularists seeking modern democracies more or less 
on European lines (or at least Turkish ones), the Arab Spring has 
borne some good, but much bitter fruit. 
Tunisia has established a developing democratic government.187  
 
 183 Max Fisher, Who Loves and Hates America: A Revealing Map of Global Opinion 
Toward the U.S., WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
worldviews/wp/2013/01/11/who-loves-and-hates-america-a-revealing-map-of-global-opi 
nion-toward-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/2LJ3-K6JP].  For a discussion of the relationship 
between Western colonization of Muslim lands and Islamic terrorism, see MCDONNELL, 
supra note 7, at 1–18. 
 184 The Arab Spring: A Year of Revolution, NPR (Dec. 17, 2011), http://www.npr.org/ 
2011/12/17/143897126/the-arab-spring-a-year-of-revolution [http://perma.cc/XS73-
MPW8]. 
 185 M. Cherif Bassiouni, The “Arab Revolution” and Transitions in the Wake of the 
“Arab Spring,” 17 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 133, 143 (2013); see also Naseema 
Noor, Tunisia: The Revolution That Started It All, INT’L AFF. REV. (Jan. 31, 2011), 
http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/257 [http://perma.cc/RWT8-3R4Y] (describing how 
Tunisia brought down the regime). 
 186 Ismaeel Naar, Timeline: Arab Spring, AL JAZEERA (Dec. 17, 2013) http://www. 
aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2013/12/timeline-arab-spring-20131217114018534352 
.html [http://perma.cc/4LVL-8DKJ]. 
 187 Carlotta Gall, Islamist Party in Tunisia Concedes to Secularists, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/28/world/africa/nidaa-tounes-ennahda-
tunisian-parliamentary-election.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/MX6W-ZT75]; Michael R. 
Gordon, Kerry Makes Surprise Stop in Tunisia, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2004), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2014/02/19/world/africa/secretary-of-state-john-kerry.html [http:// 
perma.cc/N78N-X9ZH]; see also FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 167 (highlighting reports 
on political rights and civil liberties).  But see Nanda, supra note 167 (observing that they 
lack a genuine democracy). 
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Bahrain, however, imprisoned hundreds of peaceful protesters and 
their leaders.188  Libya’s long-time dictatorial and mercurial leader 
Muammar el-Qaddafi had his forces gun down peaceful protesters, 
ultimately leading to U.N. Security Council intervention, Qaddafi’s 
death and downfall, and to continued turmoil.189  Yemenis brought 
down their dictatorial president, Ali Abdullah Seleh, but have been 
thrown into chaos.190  Syria’s al-Assad brutally used military force 
against peaceful protesters, ultimately pushing the country into a 
bloody civil war, attacking the so-called moderate Free Syrian 
Army, initially leaving ISIS largely untouched, and helping them to 
control vast territory.191  Egypt yet again experienced a more unique 
cycling from military dictatorship to freely elected civilian rule back 
to what is essentially a military dictatorship.  It is this last country 
on which this article concentrates. 
B. Hosni Mubarak, His Human Rights Violations, and the 
United States 
Succeeding Sadat in 1981, former Air Force Commander and 
Vice-President Hosni Mubarak ruled dictatorially.192  During the 
nearly thirty years Mubarak was in power as president of Egypt, the 
United States gave to Egypt more than $62 billion in military and 
civilian aid.193  Under the Camp David Accords and the Special 
International Security Assistance Act of 1979 enacted to support the 
Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, Egypt has received almost as 
 
 188 Zainab al-Khawaja, Opinion, Bahrain, a Brutal Ally, N.Y. Times (Dec. 25, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/26/opinion/bahrain-a-brutal-ally.html [http://perma.cc/ 
8XKA-GF5D]. 
 189 Nanda, supra note 167, at 13–16. 
 190 Ibrahim Sharqieh, The Price of Abandoning Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/23/opinion/the-price-of-abandoning-yemen.html?_r=0 
[http://perma.cc/X4YA-A6RZ]. 
 191 Yassin al-Haj Saleh, A Syrian’s Cry for Help, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/opinion/a-syrians-cry-for-help.html [http://perma. 
cc/G4HR-VF42]. 
 192 Anthony Shadid, Egyptian Military Dissolves Parliament, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/14/world/middleeast/14egypt.html?_r=0 [http:// 
perma.cc/8MYX-VHKD]. 
 193 JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33003, EGYPT: BACKGROUND AND 
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much U.S. aid as does Israel (at a ratio of two to three), roughly $2 
billion annually.194  Although such a payment appears benign, it 
helped Mubarak’s dictatorial regime stay in power as did receiving 
“full American backing for across nearly   three decades.”195 
Mubarak subjected not only Muslim Brotherhood members but 
also dissidents of all ideological leanings to routine arrest, torture, 
and lengthy imprisonment.196  In the last ten years of his regime, 
“10[–]15,000 [Muslim Brotherhood] members [on average] were 
tortured on a yearly basis. . . .”197  His policies ultimately led most 
of the Egyptian people to dislike, if not hate, President Mubarak.198  
The huge daily protests in Tahrir Square ultimately helped end his 
regime.199  After resigning on February 11, 2011, Mubarak was tried 
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INST. FOR NEAR E. POL’Y (Aug. 21, 2008), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/the-future-of-u.s.-assistance-to-egypt [http://perma.cc/X6L6-EDEY].  The 
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http://mcherifbassiouni.com/wp-content/uploads/Egypt-Update-24.pdf [http://perma.cc/ 
D7M5-SMZB] (“[T]ens of thousands” were tortured “during the thirty-year Mubarak 
regime . . . .”); see also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE SHARI’A AND ISLAMIC CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE IN TIME OF WAR AND PEACE 281 (2014) (discussing the violence inherent in 
military campaigns). 
 198 The widely viewed fraudulent 2010 parliamentary elections also contributed to 
Mubarak’s downfall.  See Sahar F. Aziz, Revolution Without Reform?  A Critique of 
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and convicted of murder, embezzlement, and other charges.200  The 
murder conviction was later reversed and Mubarak was given a new 
trial, but he was sentenced to three years for embezzlement.201  The 
conviction for embezzlement was later reversed on procedural 
grounds.202  Less than eighteen months after the coup, all pending 
charges against him were dismissed.203  But he was later convicted 
again and resentenced to three years for embezzlement.204  In June 
2015, the Egyptian Court of Cassation, an appellate tribunal, 
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Predictable Fiasco, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
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Get 4, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/ 
22/world/middleeast/hosni-mubarak-trial.html [http://perma.cc/RTE9-4RSW] (discussing 
Mubarak’s embezzlement).  Mubarak has already served the three-year sentence on 
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Charges Against Mubarak, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/11/30/world/hosni-mubarak-charges-dismissed-by-egyptian-court.html [http:// 
perma.cc/FP4L-9X6U] (discussing the decision to drop charges against Mubarak).  He has 
been serving the three-year sentence primarily at a highly regarded military hospital.  
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and Orders Retrial, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
01/14/world/middleeast/hosni-mubarak-conviction-overturned.html?r=0 [http://perma.cc/ 
2Y6S-2PH8].  Similarly, an Egyptian court acquitted Mubarak’s infamous interior 
minister of defense “of the last of several charges that have kept him behind bars.”  David 
D. Kirkpatrick, Court Clears Mubarak Official, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2015), http:// 
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ordered Mubarak to stand for a third trial on the murder charges.205 
C. The Egyptian Elections Stemming From the Arab Spring 
The Presidential and Parliamentary elections that followed 
Mubarak’s resignation, unfortunately, reflect the consequences of 
decades of dictatorial rule.  For most of Egypt’s history, including 
the years following the Officers Revolt of 1952, opposition political 
parties had been banned, dissent had been prohibited, and the press 
and other electronic media had been reined in.206  The only effective 
opposing political organization during the rule of Nasser, Sadat, and 
Mubarak was the Muslim Brotherhood.207  Although under Mubarak 
the Muslim Brotherhood had to put up nominally “independent” 
candidates for public office,208 the Brotherhood knew how to run 
political campaigns, had years of practice doing so, and were 
successful in getting their followers out to vote.209 
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T56Q-72HT] (“In reality, Egypt’s ‘Revolution’ was a partial regime change.  It brought 
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On the other hand, the young secular leaders of Egypt’s Arab 
Spring had no such experience, had no long standing organization 
behind them, and had less ability to assure that their followers would 
make it to the polls.210  Furthermore, the main opponent to 
Muhammad Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, was Ahmed 
Shafik, a former prime minister in the widely despised Mubarak 
regime.211  Consequently, a significant number of the secularists 
never turned out to vote.212  So although the young secularists led 
the Arab Spring and were more responsible for deposing Mubarak 
than any other political group,213 the Muslim Brotherhood ended up 
winning the first presidential election.214  The Muslim Brotherhood 
also polled well in the upper house of parliament (the Shura 
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XKWK]; see also Shadi Hamid, How Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Will Win, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Nov. 3, 2011), http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/11/03/how-egypts-muslim-
brotherhood-will-win [http://perma.cc/DXM7-6GBM] (discussing the education, 
discipline, and popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood). 
 214 Muslim Brotherhood-Backed Candidate Morsi Wins Egyptian Presidential 
Election, FOX NEWS (June 24, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/06/24/egypt-
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 215 Leila Fadel, Muslim Brotherhood’s Political Party Consolidates Power in 
Egyptian Parliament, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/middle_east/muslim-brotherhoods-political-party-consolidates-power-in-parliame 
nt/2012/02/28/gIQA70sMgR_story.html [https://perma.cc/R3ZR-WZW5].  The 
Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party won 235 seats (47.2%); the “hardline Salafist 
Nour party” won 121 seats (24.3%), giving Islamists parties “around two-thirds of the seats 
in the assembly.”  Egypt’s Islamist Parties Win Elections to Parliament, BBC (Jan. 21, 
2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16665748 [http://perma.cc/52DK-
MHPC].  The Freedom and Justice party won 42% of the seats in the Shura Council, and 
was “easily” able to gain a majority with “support from conservative allies.”  Egypt’s 
Shura Council and Constitution Panel ‘Invalid,’ BBC (June 2, 2013), 
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From the Brotherhood’s point of view, this was a well-deserved 
victory.  They had been participating in essentially a rigged electoral 
process under the Mubarak regime for decades.216  After years of 
effort and after seeing so many of their candidates fraudulently 
denied public office,217 many of their members carted off to jail, and 
some to Mubarak’s torture chambers,218 the Muslim Brotherhood 
won on both the executive and legislative levels.219 
Yet the quality of their organization rather than the quality of 
their ideas probably led the Muslim Brotherhood to victory.  Had 
the secularists a similar organization and party behind them and a 
different candidate to vote for, the result could very well have been 
different.220  Nevertheless, the Brotherhood did what many other 
political parties in their situation probably would do.  President 
Morsi and his party proceeded to make a grab for power.  They had 
the Brotherhood-dominated Parliament dictate an Islamist-oriented 
constitution to lock in their control.  “[A] Muslim Brotherhood-led 
drafting panel . . . rushed the document through a Constituent 
Assembly in one day without significant public discussion.”221  
After successfully brokering a resolution of a dispute in Palestine, 
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Morsi took an unconstitutional leap: he declared himself as 
President outside the jurisdiction of the courts, permitting him to 
rule by decree.222 
D. The “Judicial Coup” and Human Rights Violations 
Committed under SCAF 
After Mubarak resigned but before the presidential and 
parliamentary elections, the Supreme Command of the Armed 
Forces (“SCAF”) took over executive powers.223  Two days before 
the runoff in the 2012 presidential election, Egypt’s Supreme 
Constitutional Court, made up of all Mubarak appointees, dissolved 
Egypt’s first democratically elected house of parliament in which 
the Muslim Brotherhood together with other Islamic representatives 
had achieved a majority.224  The court also invalidated a parliament 
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2016 A CALL TO STRENGTHEN THE RULE OF LAW 359 
statute that prohibited senior Mubarak era officials from running for 
high office.225  A large number of Egyptians “suspected that SCAF 
had improperly meddled with the court’s deliberations.”226  The 
court’s decision had the effect of leaving legislative power in the 
hands of the military (which had already possessed executive power 
pending the election).227  According to the New York Times, “Many 
analysts and activists feared the decision was a step toward re-
establishing a military-backed autocracy.”228  One scholar likewise 
criticized the court: 
The final yet no less troubling aspect of the decisions is that the 
SCC [Supreme Constitutional Court] looks as if it has done the 
full political bidding of the Ancien Régime.  It finds its references 
in the military rulers ‘constitutional declarations’, it dissolves a 
seemingly adverse Parliament on grounds of inequality that 
miss[es] the forest for the trees, and it allows a former pillar of the 
Mubarak regime to go unchallenged.229 
Aside from suspected complicity in that court’s decision, the 
SCAF committed serious human rights violations, routinely using 
excessive force against civilians, arresting a large number of 
civilians on political grounds, subjecting them to military trials, and 
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E. Human Rights Violations under the Morsi Administration 
President Morsi’s assuming office was also accompanied by 
human rights violations.231  In January 2013, there were violent 
clashes in Port Said, leaving over forty protesters dead, most at the 
hands of the Security Forces.232  Instead of calling for an 
investigation, President Morsi, presumably trying to curry favor 
with the military and the other security forces, essentially made 
them immune from prosecution or any other disciplinary action.233  
The Constitution that he and the Brotherhood rushed through 
parliament failed to respect woman’s rights or the rights of religious 
minorities.234  The Islamic dominated parliament also attempted to 
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 233 AMNESTY INT’L, supra 230, at 6. 
 234 Id.  President Morsi also issued a law [Law No. 107 of 2012] on December 9, 
2012, authorizing the military to arrest civilians and “to refer them to military courts until 
results are announced in the December 15[, 2012]” constitutional referendum.  Egypt: 
Morsy Law Invites Military Trials of Civilians, supra note 230.  This law ignored the 
Council of State decree of June 26, 2013, which prohibited military enforcement of civil 
law.  Id.; see also Nanda, supra note 167, at 8–12 (discussing some of the Morsi regime’s 
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pass statutes to limit freedom of association and assembly.235  
Furthermore, his government failed to take action against the men 
who sexually attacked women in or near Tahrir Square during the 
protests.236 
In addition, some Muslim Brotherhood members engaged in 
violence against their political opponents.237  Some riots and protests 
turned bloody.  Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) noted that Muslim 
Brotherhood members detained forty-nine anti-Morsi protesters 
outside the presidential palace on December 5, 2012.238  The 
Egyptian Security Forces failed to intervene.  These detentions 
“followed armed clashes that resulted in the deaths of [ten] people, 
mostly Muslim Brotherhood members, and injuries to 748 more, 
according to the Health Ministry.”239  Troubling, according to HRW, 
was President Morsi’s characterizing the protesters as paid 
informants instead of demanding an independent investigation of 
both events.240  During Morsi’s regime, there were also more 
 
abuses of power). 
 235 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 230, at 6. 
 236 Despite the coup and the Egyptian authorities’ attacks, the Brotherhood apparently 
still has attempted to protest peacefully rather than resorting to violence.  “In their strategy 
of confrontation, the MB have tried to resort to peaceful demonstrations and protests as a 
way of showing not only to Egyptians but to the international community that they are 
engaging in the reasonable exercise of the right to freedom of expression and assembly.”  
Bassiouni, Egypt Update Number 25, supra note 209.  Nonetheless, sometimes violence is 
resorted to.  Id.; see also Egypt: Morsi Loyalists Vow to Keep Up ‘Peaceful’ Protest, BBC 
(July 11, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23274632 [http://perma.cc/ 
GH8S-T4NN] (talking about the pledge for peaceful protests after 50 Morsi loyalists were 
killed in clashes with the army). 
 237 Abdel-Rahman Hussein, Muhammad Morsi Calls for Dialogue in Attempt to Quell 
Egypt’s Anger, GUARDIAN (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2012/dec/06/mohamed-morsi-egypt [http://perma.cc/K97E-TERN] (reporting that 350 
persons were injured in fights with rocks and firebombs between Morsi supporters and 
opponents and that the police failed to intervene when opponents burned down the Cairo 
office of the Muslim Brotherhood); see also Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Egypt—
Investigate Brotherhood’s Abuse of Protesters—Prosecutor Should Examine Authorities’ 
Role in Unlawful Detention, Mistreatment (Dec. 12, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/news/ 
2012/12/12/egypt-investigate-brotherhoods-abuse-protesters [https://perma.cc/Z37Y-
C8BN]; Shlaim, supra note 219. 
 238 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, supra note 237.  The events of December 5, 
2012, form the basis for the capital charges that have been brought against President Morsi.  
Professor Bassiouni argues that the charges are “on their face broad and vague.”  
Bassiouni, Egypt Update Number 25, supra note 209. 
 239 Press Release, Human Rights Watch, supra note 237. 
 240 Id. 
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criminal prosecutions for blasphemy as well as increased attacks on 
Coptic Christians and Shia Muslims.241 
Some have pointed to the “trauma” induced by the Morsi regime 
and have criticized Morsi for trying “to change Egyptian 
identity.”242  Others have objected to President Morsi asserting ever 
increasing power while he “mismanaged the country, g[ave] a 
monopoly on decision making to the Muslim Brotherhood and his 
Islamist allies, and encroached on the judiciary.”243  Still others 
stressed his calling a referendum on a constitution that “undermines 
basic freedoms and violates universal rights.”244  Furthermore, some 
believe that the Muslim Brotherhood merely tagged on to the Arab 
Spring, and, therefore, was an undeserving recipient of the political 
opening that the young secularists responsible for the Arab Spring 
made possible.245 
On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood generally had kept 
its pledge to renounce violence.246  As Avi Shlaim observed, Morsi 
 
 241 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 230, at 6. 
 242 Maha Yahya, Choosing Security and Freedom in Egypt, CARNEGIE MIDDLE E. 
CTR. (July 1, 2014), http://carnegie-mec.org/2014/07/01/choosing-security-and-freedom-
in-egypt/hexr [http://perma.cc/7CGT-KWZN]; see also Dennis B. Ross, Opinion, 
Islamists Are Not Our Friends, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/09/12/opinion/islamists-are-not-our-friends.html [http://perma.cc/67LM-EHQS] 
(setting forth key principles of how America should move forward with Islamist nations). 
 243 Hamza Hendawi, Egypt’s Opposition Criticizes President’s Speech, HUFFINGTON 
POST (June 27, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20130627/ml-
egypt/?m=true [https://perma.cc/HZ3M-9GZH]. 
 244 Sarah El Deeb, Egypt Sets Date for Constitution Vote, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 2, 
2012), https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2012/12/02/egypt-president-sets-date-
for-constitution-vote/gVbnsrqWw5ET0HhiqB18BK/story.html [https://perma.cc/9LDE-
3CWB] (quoting Nobel Peace laureate Muhammad el-Baradei); see also Morsi’s Failure 
to Connect with People Caused His Downfall, MEHR NEWS AGENCY (July 6, 2013), 
http://www.moqawamah.com/?a=content.id&id=12923&print=1 [http://perma.cc/4K6Q-
HNQG] (observing that Morsi’s impolitic tone and policy toward the opposition greatly 
contributed to his overthrow). 
 245 See Muqtedar Khan, Islam, Democracy and Islamism After the Counterrevolution 
in Egypt, 21 MIDDLE E. POL’Y 9, 75, 80 (2014). 
 246 Despite the coup and the Egyptian authorities’ attacks, the Brotherhood apparently 
still have attempted to protest peacefully.  Bassiouni, Egypt Update Number 25, supra note 
209 (“In their strategy of confrontation, the MB have tried to resort to peaceful 
demonstrations and protests as a way of showing not only to Egyptians but to the 
international community that they are engaging in the reasonable exercise of the right to 
freedom of expression and assembly.”).  Nonetheless, sometimes violence ensues.  Id.; see 
also Maggie Michael & Sarah El Deeb, Bombings Rock Egyptian Capital, Killing 5 
People, YAHOO! NEWS (Jan. 24, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/bombings-rock-egyptian-
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“represents the moderate and modernist core of the Muslim 
Brotherhood that renounced violence decades ago.”247  Compared to 
other countries that underwent a military overthrow of democratic 
rule, the Morsi regime’s abuses were far from extreme: “[The Morsi 
regime’s] excesses fell well short of those of [Venezuela’s Hugo] 
Chavez, or Chile’s Salvador Allende; unlike [Thailand’s] 
Shinawatra or [Argentina’s] Perón, Morsi did not set up militias or 
establish death squads.  Although his government failed to 
compromise with opponents and sought to concentrate its power, it 
made only modest attempts to impose its Islamic ideology on the 
country and did not seek to alter Egypt’s capitalist economy, which 
was slowly sinking but not imploding.  It preserved crucial foreign 
relationships with the United States and Israel.”248 
Seeing their Arab Spring revolution exploited by the Muslim 
Brotherhood, the secularists, however, went back to Tahrir Square 
to protest Morsi’s and the Brotherhood’s actions.249  The protests 
extended beyond the square to most parts of the country.  The still 
failing Egyptian economy added to the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
unpopularity.250  Massive demonstrations, like those resulting in 
Mubarak’s overthrow, were now aimed at Morsi and the 
Brotherhood.  The opposition movement claimed they had obtained 
twenty-two million signatures on a petition for Morsi to step 
down.251  The Egyptian military, which had been part of the Security 
 
capital-killing-5-people-094759738.html [https://perma.cc/5HLW-64WP] (reporting that 
al-Qaeda-inspired group, Amnsar Beit al Maqdis, had claimed responsibility for other 
attacks but not this one, yet suggesting that some believed the Muslim Brotherhood, 
despite its denials, was behind the attack). 
 247 Shlaim, supra note 219. 




 249 Ahmed A. Namatalla & Ahmed Khalil El-Sayed, Egypt Islamists, Secularists 
Clash at Tahrir Square Protests, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 12, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-10-11/egypt-brotherhood-calls-for-prote 
stsprotests-at-camel-battle-acquittal [http://perma.cc/U2CN-FNHA]. 
 250 “The millions of Egyptians who took to the streets were also protesting chronic 
gas and food shortages and a sinking economy.”  After the Coup: The U.S. Shouldn’t Cut 
Off Aid to Egypt, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/ 
news/articles/SB10001424127887324399404578583932317286550 [http://perma.cc/ 
7NBN-XHZA]. 
 251 Abigail Hauslohner, Egyptian Group Accuses U.S. of Backing Morsi on Eve of 
Nationwide Protest Rallies, WASH. POST (June 29, 2013), https://www.washington 
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Forces that had put down the Brotherhood for decades, were 
likewise uncomfortable with the Brotherhood’s rise to power.  
There is substantial evidence that the Egyptian military 
surreptitiously provided money and other resources to the anti-
Morsi protests preceding the military overthrow and played a 
significant role in orchestrating the anti-Morsi demonstrations.252 
Furthermore, the military had vital economic interests at stake.  
Unlike the military branch in most other countries, Egypt’s military 
also ran many major money-making enterprises in the country, 
holding from five to sixty percent of the country’s economy.253  
After Morsi’s election, there had been calls for the military to be 
divested of these enterprises.254  The Morsi regime had been 
planning to develop an area along the Suez Canal, but had cut out 
the military from any economic participation in the over eight 





 252 Iraq: ISIS Announces Caliphate, BBC WORLD SERVICE (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p021g1r5 [http://perma.cc/6ED5-8UNQ] (observing 
that one of the leaders of the protest movement was taking orders from the Egyptian 
military as early as March 2013); see also Hamza Hendawi, Disputes Between Morsi, 
Military Led to Egypt Coup, YAHOO! NEWS (July 18, 2013), 
http://news.yahoo.com/disputes-between-morsi-military-led-egypt-coup-205809544.html 
[https://perma.cc/BTA6-CR37] (explaining that “the military had been planning for 
months to take greater control of the political reins in Egypt” and that “the military helped 
the Tamarod [opposition movement] from early on”); David D. Kirkpatrick, Recordings 
Suggest Emirates and Egyptian Military Pushed Ousting of Morsi, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/02/world/middleeast/recordings-suggest-
emirates-and-egyptian-military-pushed-ousting-of-morsi.html [http://perma.cc/LYM2-
VG9P] (giving evidence that the Egyptian military supported the protests). 
 253 Abigail Hauslohner, Egyptian Military Expands Its Control over the Country’s 
Economy, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ 
middle_east/egyptian-military-expands-its-economiceconomic-control/2014/03/16/39508 
b52-a554-11e3-b865-38b254d92063_story.html [https://perma.cc/X37D-7DD9]; see also 
Ahmed Morsy, The Military Crowds out Civilian Business in Egypt, CARNEGIE 
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (June 24, 2014), http://carnegieendowment.org/ 
2014/06/24/military-crowds-out-civilian-business-in-egypt/hedq [http://perma.cc/3CNM-
U7RD] (detailing the historical role of the military in Egypt’s economy and how it has 
grown). 
 254 See Pelin Cengiz, Egyptian Army Considered Economic Stakes in Coup, AL 
MONITOR (July 10, 2013), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/iw/politics/2013/07/egypt-
army-economic-interests-coup-morsi.html [http://perma.cc/9KD7-ZWKZ]. 
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years.255  Some speculate that this omission may have contributed to 
the military’s decision to overthrow him.256 
F. The Military Coup, the Military’s Repression of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, and the U.S. Response 
By July 2013, the Egyptian military under General Abdul Fattah 
el-Sisi decided to carry out a coup d’état against the first 
democratically elected and the first civilian president of Egypt.257  
The available evidence suggests that, at best, the Obama 
administration made a half-hearted stance against the military’s 
coup.258  El-Sisi says the United States ambassador asked him “to 
hold off ‘for a day or two’ before ousting” Muhammad Morsi, but 
claims he “had rebuffed the request.”259  The secularists likewise 
supported the coup, some calling it a legitimate impeachment of an 
unpopular ruler.260 
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nytimes.com/2012/06/14/latest-updates-on-electoral-turmoil-in-egypt/?module=Search& 
mabReward=relbias%3Ar.egypt/ [http://perma.cc/HSM6-GYFD]. 
 258 See Paul Richter, Morsi’s Ouster Fuels Debate on U.S. Policy on the Mideast, L.A. 
TIMES (July 5, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-us-egypt-
20130706-story.html [http://perma.cc/6BEE-YJ6S]; President Barack Obama, Statement 
on Egypt (July 3, 2013) (“The United States is monitoring the very fluid situation in Egypt, 
and we believe that ultimately the future of Egypt can only be determined by the Egyptian 
people.”); David D. Kirkpatrick & Mayy El Sheikh, Morsi Spurned Deal, Seeing the 
Military as Tamed, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2013),  http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07 
/07/world/middleeast/morsi-spurned-deals-to-the-end-seeing-the-military-as-tamed.html 
[http://perma.cc/UE69-QS26] (describing Obama’s attempts to urge Mr. Morsi to 
compromise with the opposition). 
 259 David D. Kirkpatrick, U.S. Sought Delay of Morsi’s Ouster, Egyptian Leader Says, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/world/middleeast/us-
sought-delay-of-morsis-ouster-egyptian-leader-says.html [http://perma.cc/6R4D-597X]. 
 260 See Bassiouni, Egypt Update Number 25, supra note 209 (“I take the position that 
it was a military coup, but that it had popular legitimacy, and that it did go against formal 
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The coup essentially put the military back in control of Egypt 
after the great move forward propelled by the Arab Spring.261  Upon 
returning to full power, the new military leadership decided to 
stamp out the Muslim Brotherhood, the most significant 
organization opposing Egypt’s heretofore unbroken and oppressive 
military rule since the Officers’ Revolt in 1952.262  On coming into 
power, the military installed Adly Mansour as “Interim 
President.”263  First, a Mubarak-appointed court dissolved the 
Muslim Brotherhood and ordered its property confiscated.264  
 
legality because Morsi had been duly elected—a position which the United States 
supported at the time; namely, that he was the duly elected president of Egypt.  But millions 
took to the streets on June 30, 2013 against the MB, and there was also a petition prepared 
by the group Tamarrud (the group spearheading calls for the June 30 demonstrations) 
allegedly signed by 22 million people for his removal from office.  There was no 
constitution in effect, though the 2012 Constitution had been approved by a public 
referendum, but it never went into effect.  There was no way to legally impeach or remove 
the president, thus the conflict between popular legitimacy expressed in the streets and in 
the petition and formal legality expressed in the election of Morsi in 2012.”).  I am indebted 
to Professor Bassiouni for his deep, scholarly research and writing on Egypt.  I respectfully 
disagree, nonetheless, with his argument about “popular legitimacy” as implicitly 
justifying the coup, however unpopular Morsi may have been.  On other support for the 
coup, see David Francis, How the U.S. Helped Fund the Egyptian Coup, FISCAL TIMES 
(July 8, 2013), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/07/08/How-the-US-Helped-
Fund-the-Egyptian-Coup [http://perma.cc/E8HA-NXMJ] (citing Muhammad El Baradei, 
the former U.N. Nuclear Watchdog Head, and describing the United States refusal to call 
the situation in Egypt a coup).  The extremely conservative, Al-Nur party, also supported 
the military’s plan or roadmap after the coup.  See Nervana Mahmoud, In Egypt Watch the 
Nour Party, AL MONITOR (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/ 
01/egypt-nour-party-gathers-strength.html [http://perma.cc/FT97-7PRG] (describing 
Nour’s approach following Morsi’s election); Muhammad A. Arafa, Whither Egypt?  
Against Religious Fascism and Legal Authoritarianism: Pure Revolution, Popular Coup, 
or a Military Coup d’Etat?, 24 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 859, 861 (2014) (claiming that 
Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood were comparable to Hitler and the Nazi Party). 
 261 See Laura King & Ingy Hassieb, Egyptian Court Bans Muslim Brotherhood, 
Orders Its Assets Confiscated, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2013), http:// 
articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/23/world/la-fg-wn-egypt-muslim-brotherhood-banned-201 
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 262 See id.; Profile: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, supra note 101 (describing the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s organization since the Officers’ Revolt in 1952). 
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N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/01/world/middleeast/ 
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 264 Id.  The Egyptian Supreme Judicial Court banned the Brotherhood’s political party 
as well, the Freedom and Justice Party.  Kimberly Bennett, Court Bans Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Political Wing, JURIST (Aug. 9, 2014), http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/ 
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Second, although the Brotherhood had renounced violence decades 
ago265 and had generally abided by that pledge, the new military 
government’s cabinet declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist 
organization.266  So just as the secular Egyptian government had 
done in 1948 and Nasser in 1954, the Egyptian military controlled 
government in 2013 banned the Muslim Brotherhood.267  
Furthermore, Mansour dissolved the Shura Council, the Islamic 
dominated upper house of Parliament.268 
Not satisfied with overthrowing the President and banning the 
Brotherhood, the military arrested and imprisoned virtually all the 
Brotherhood’s leaders, including President Muhammad Morsi and 
the Brotherhood’s highest spiritual leader Muhammad Badie.269  
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but will instead be tried by a military tribunal.  Top Brotherhood Officials Referred to 
Military Trial, Mursi Not Among Them—State Agency, ASWAT MASRIYA (Feb. 17, 2015), 
http://en.aswatmasriya.com/news/view.aspx?id=a9baa3e6-8181-446b-94d9-a8753cbbbf5 
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The military regime initially charged Morsi with a capital offense 
for allegedly inciting violence and recently sentenced him to twenty 
years in a maximum security prison.270  After a mass trial, an 
Egyptian court sentenced Muhammad Badie to death. 271  In that trial 
the court sentenced 682 other individuals (predominantly Muslim 
Brotherhood members) to death “in connection with the killing of a 
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with Human Rights Abuses, GUARDIAN (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
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the retrial of 36 who were sentenced to death.  Court to Retry 36 over Post-Rabaa 
Dispersal Violence in Minya, ASWAT MASRIYA (Feb. 11, 2015), http:// 
allafrica.com/stories/201502111455.html [http://perma.cc/7P5M-2S3Z]. 
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single police officer during a riot last summer.”272  A month earlier 
in a summary trial, the same Egyptian court had sentenced 529 
individuals to death.273  Although most of these capital sentences are 
not expected to be enforced,274 Egypt carried out its first death 
sentence against an Islamic supporter of Morsi on March 7, 2015,275 
and an Egyptian court promptly confirmed death sentences against 
thirty-seven defendants from the first mass trial, including against 
Badie276 (only the intercession of Egypt’s grand mufti has prevented 
 
 272 Jonathan Weisman, Military Aid for Egypt Loses Support in the Senate, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/30/us/politics/egypt.html 
[http://perma.cc/5USQ-8W5P].  Other charges included attacking a police station, 
destroying public property, and seizing weapons.  Egypt: ICJ Condemns Further Mass 
Death Sentences, INT’L COMMISSION JURISTS (Apr. 28, 2014), http://www.icj.org/egypt-
icj-condemns-further-mass-death-sentences/ [http://perma.cc/4LNV-N3EJ]. 
 273 Egypt Three Years on, Wide-Scale Repression Continues Unabated, AMNESTY 
INT’L (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/egypt-three-years-wide-scale-
repression-continues-unabated-2014-01-23 [http://perma.cc/ZLJ6-WSAA] (“Since July 3, 
2013, 1,400 people have been killed in political violence, most of them due to excessive 
force used by security forces.  No proper investigation has been carried out into the deaths 
of more than 500 Morsi supporters when excessive force was used to disperse a sit-in at 
Rabaa al-Adawiya in August 2013.  Not a single member of the security forces has been 
charged in connection with the incident which was a callous bloodbath on an 
unprecedented scale.” (emphasis added)).  One hundred eighty-three Muslim Brotherhood 
supporters were sentenced to death after being convicted of “playing a role in the killings 
of [sixteen] police officers in the town of Kardasa in August 2013 during the upheaval that 
followed the army’s ousting of Islamist president Mohamed Morsi.”  Egyptian Court 
Sentences 183 Muslim Brotherhood Supporters to Death, GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/02/egypt-muslim-brotherhood-supporters-
sentenced-death [http://perma.cc/S5SG-WBZB]. 
 274 Death Penalty Worldwide, CORNELL L. SCH., http://www.deathpenalty 
worldwide.org/country-search-post.cfm?country=Egypt [http://perma.cc/4S8C-NT8Y] 
(last updated June 1, 2015) (“We believe there are at least 1,700 people under sentence of 
death [in Egypt], but no official figures are available due to intense state secrecy 
surrounding capital punishment.  Amnesty International indicates that at least 1,413 death 
sentences were issued between 2007 and 2014.  In recent years there has been a sharp 
increase in courts’ use of capital punishment, with the number of death sentences jumping 
from 109 in 2013 to at least 509.  Since the beginning of 2015, there have been reports of 
at least 354 death sentences, some of which may be reviewed or appealed.  Executions in 
2015 to date: 12.”). 
 275 Kareem Fahim, Egypt Executes an Islamist Supporter of Ousted President, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/08/world/middleeast/egypt-
executes-an-islamist-supporter-of-ousted-president.html [http://perma.cc/94V8-WQ78]. 
 276 Yasmine Saleh & Dominic Evans, Egypt Upholds Death Sentence on Brotherhood 
Leader, Nearly 200 Supporters, WALL ST. J. (June 21, 2014), https://www.washington 
post.com/world/egypt-upholds-death-sentence-on-brotherhood-leader-nearly-200-suppor 
ters/2014/06/21/43eca592-f98b-11e3-8aa9-dad2ec039789_story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
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an execution from that trial).277  The court sentenced the remaining 
492 individuals from that mass trial to twenty-five years 
imprisonment at hard labor.278 
From the outset of the coup, the military brutally put down 
protests and demonstrations of the Muslim Brotherhood.279  Aside 
from arresting the Brotherhood’s top leadership and rank and file 
who openly objected to Morsi’s overthrow, the Security Forces five 
days later fired on hundreds who took part in a protest against 
Egypt’s military coup.280  Over fifty people were killed and more 
than 400 injured.281  Less than two weeks later, the Security Forces 
killed seventy-four people, shooting many in “the head or the 
chest,” suggesting an intent not to disperse peacefully but to kill.282  
 
N6A4-FEFA].  In another case, Badie and his deputy Khairat al-Shater along with other 
Brotherhood leaders were sentenced to life in prison.  Muslim Brotherhood Members 
Sentenced to Life in Prison, TIMES ISRAEL (Feb. 28, 2015), http:// 
www.timesofisrael.com/muslim-brotherhood-leaders-sentenced-to-life-in-prison/ [http:// 
perma.cc/RL9A-JYZU]. 
 277 Kareem Fahim & Merna Thomas, Key Cleric in Egypt Rejects Executions, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/world/middleeast/key-cleric-
in-egypt-rejects-executions.html [http://perma.cc/K4PA-LWFR] (noting that the religious 
leader’s intercession seen as a rebuff to Egypt’s military regime and to the courts).  
Nevertheless, Egyptian President, Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, promised changes in laws to allow 
for faster executions.  Patrick Kingsley, Egyptian President “to Change Law to Allow 
Faster Executions,” GUARDIAN (June 30, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2015/jun/30/egyptian-president-al-sisi-change-law-faster-executions-death-penalty 
[https://perma.cc/LTX6-PKYF]. 
 278 Egypt: ICJ Condemns Further Mass Death Sentences, supra note 272.  Both mass 
trials were held by the Minya Criminal Court.  Id.  Most were tried and sentenced in 
absentia: Of the 683 sentenced, only 80 individuals were under arrest.  Id. 
 279 See sources cited supra note 273; SHARP, supra note 193; Eric Trager & Gavi 
Barnhard, Brothers in Trouble?, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 24, 2014), https:// 
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2014-09-24/brothers-trouble [http://perma.cc/ 
XT3A-C3VD]; At Least Six Dead as Islamist Protesters Clash with Police in Cairo, 
GUARDIAN (July 17, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/17/people-killed-
islamist-protest-cairo-egypt [http://perma.cc/KCC7-S5JT]; Egypt Court Condemns 9 to 
Death for Killing of Judge’s Bodyguard, NEWS24 (Sept. 7, 2015), http:// 
www.news24.com/Africa/News/Egypt-court-condemns-9-to-death-for-killing-of-judges-
bodyguard-20150907 [http://perma.cc/T9HS-S72G]. 
 280 Chris Hughes, Ahmed Assem: Chilling Video Shows Egyptian Photographer 
Filming Sniper as He Shoots Him, MIRROR (July 10, 2013), http://www.mirror.co.uk/ 
news/world-news/ahmed-assem-video-egyptian-photographer-2042649 [http://perma.cc/ 
3Z7G-YP7B]. 
 281 Id. 
 282 Kareem Fahim & Mayy El Sheikh, Crackdown in Egypt Kills Islamists as They 
Protest, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/world/ 
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On August 14, 2013, the Egyptian Security Forces frontally 
attacked Muslim Brotherhood protesters, killing, in a 12 hour 
deliberate assault, at least 600 and possibly as many as 1,000 
persons in a sit-in, and wounding over 3,700 others.283  The 
government’s onslaught against the Muslim Brotherhood is 
ongoing.  Amnesty International reported that 1,400 people have 
been killed in the violence, most of them at the hands of Egyptian 
Security Forces, using “excessive force.” 284 
 
middleeast/egypt.html [http://perma.cc/7Q3Z-FP4N] (“The tactics—many were killed [by 
the Egyptian security forces] with gunshot wounds to the head or the chest—suggested 
that Egypt’s security services felt no need to show any restraint.”). 
 283 David D. Kirkpatrick, Hundreds Die as Egyptian Forces Attack Islamist 
Protesters, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/15/ 
world/middleeast/egypt.html?ref=world [http://perma.cc/4YG8-SJ95] (“But the scale [of 
the Security Forces’ attack]—lasting more than 12 hours, with armored vehicles, 
bulldozers, tear gas, birdshot, live ammunition and snipers—and the ferocity far exceeded 
the Interior Ministry’s promises of a gradual and measured dispersal.”); All According to 
Plan: The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt, HUM. RTS. WATCH 
(Aug. 12, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-
massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt [http://perma.cc/3Z7G-YP7B] (“The gravest 
incident of mass protester killings occurred on August 14, when security forces crushed 
the major pro-Morsy sit-in in Rab’a al-Adawiya Square in the Nasr City district of eastern 
Cairo. Using armored personnel carriers (APCs), bulldozers, ground forces, and snipers, 
police and army personnel attacked the makeshift protest encampment, where 
demonstrators, including women and children, had been camped out for over 45 days, and 
opened fire on the protesters, killing at least 817 and likely more than 1,000.”); see also 
Ken Roth, Egypt’s Tiananmen, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 12, 2014), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/12/egypts-tiananmen [http://perma.cc/3Z7G-YP7B] 
(arguing that the Rabaa dispersal was part of a pattern of cases across Egypt in which 
security forces used excessive force). 
 284 AMNESTY INT’L, EGYPT: HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRISIS: SYSTEMIC VIOLATIONS AND 
IMPUNITY 6 (2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde12/034/2014/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/8Q24-W8JR]; Egypt Three Years on, Wide-Scale Repression Continues 
Unabated, supra note 273.  Although one might expect the Muslim Brotherhood to react 
violently to the repressions, the New York Times reports that despite the coup regime’s 
claims to the contrary, “there is no publically available evidence” that new violent 
presumably Islamist groups who have emerged after the coup and who have carried out 
attacks against businesses, utilities and the police have links to the Brotherhood.  David D. 
Kirkpatrick, Egypt Arrests 75 in Connection with Recent Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/13/world/middleeast/egypt-arrests-75-in-
connection-with-recent-attacks.html [http://perma.cc/P8YM-JHZ4].  Since the coup, there 
has been a significant rise in terrorist type attacks.  See Merna Thomas & David D. 
Kirkpatrick, Obscure Group Says It Set Off Blasts in Egypt, Raising Alarm, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/27/world/middleeast/egypt-giza-
bomb-explosions.html [http://perma.cc/62ZA-T9PD] (describing a pattern of attacks on 
retail stores, including the Popular Resistant Movement’s attack); Egypt Military Court 
Sentences 7 to Death on Charges Related to Terrorism, AHRAM ONLINE (Oct. 21, 2014), 
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Refusing to restrict their fire to the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
post-coup military regime has banned all demonstrations it has not 
expressly approved, potentially muzzling not only the Brotherhood 
but all other groups285 seeking to protest the military’s authority and 
policies.286  Furthermore, the military has referred over 800 civilians 




nces--to-death-on-charge.aspx [http://perma.cc/P4L6-KENS] (noting that President el-Sisi 
declared a state of emergency for three months in the Sinai Peninsula). 
 285 David D. Kirkpatrick & Merna Thomas, Egyptian Media to Limit Criticism of 
Government, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/27/world/ 
middleeast/egyptian-media-to-limit-criticism-of-government.html [http://perma.cc/ 
T5KL-YC22] (noting that Egypt sentenced twenty-three non-Islamist protesters to three 
years in prison for failing to obtain a permit to protest); see also David D. Kirkpatrick & 
Merna Thomas, Egyptian Blogger Sentenced to 5 Years in Prison for Protest Role, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/world/middleeast/blogger-
who-led-protests-is-given-a-five-year-sentence-in-egypt.html [http://perma.cc/FQ47-
DV9P] (noting that the secular blogger, Alaa Abd el Fattah, 33, was one of the best known 
faces of the Egyptian Arab Spring); Egypt: Lift Ban on Youth Opposition Group, HUM. 
RTS. WATCH (Apr. 30, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/30/egypt-lift-ban-
youth-opposition-group [https://perma.cc/NLZ2-5B75] (describing an Egyptian court’s 
ban on the activities of the April 6 Movement is a clear violation of citizens’ rights to free 
association, peaceful assembly, and free expression). 
 286 Kirkpatrick & Thomas, Egyptian Media to Limit Criticism of Government, supra 
note 285.  The International Commission of Jurists observed that “[o]ther judges have been 
accused of forming an illegal group, ‘Judges for Egypt,’ which called for the return of the 
ousted President Morsi.  Egypt: Military, Government and Politicized Judiciary Are 
Crushing Freedom of Expression, INT’L COMMISSION JURISTS (June 24, 2014), http:// 
www.icj.org/egypt-military-government-and-politicized-judiciary-are-crushing-freedom-
of-expression/ [http://perma.cc/8WUZ-GUBJ].  “They were referred to a disciplinary 
board for charges that include ‘stirring sedition among the ranks of judges’ and 
‘threatening public security.’”  Id.  The International Commission of Jurists also 
condemned the use of oppressive laws against peaceful protesters, observing that on June 
11, 2014, “under Law no. 107 of 2013 on public meetings, processions and protests, the 
South Cairo Criminal Court convicted 25 individuals and sentenced them to 15 years 
imprisonment for participating in a demonstration in front of the Shura Council.”  Id.  In a 
similar vein, the el-Sisi regime also failed to protect Coptic churches against Muslim 
Brotherhood members’ attacks in the wake of the coup.  Egypt – Mass Attacks on Churches 
– Christians Say Pleas for Protection Fell Largely on Deaf Ears, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 
21, 2013), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/21/egypt-mass-attacks-churches [http:// 
perma.cc/TT6C-8XDJ].  On the other hand, the el-Sisi government responded militarily to 
ISIS killing Coptic Christian hostages.  Egypt Avenges Mass Beheadings, Strikes ISIS in 
Libya, JERUSALEM POST (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Egypt-
avenges-mass-beheadings-strikes-ISIS-in-Libya-391164 [http://perma.cc/M8HU-JSVN]. 
 287 See Egypt: Surge of Military Trials, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 18, 2014), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/12/18/egypt-surge-military-trials [http://perma.cc/ 
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The Egyptian government has also shackled the press and 
generally denied the freedom of expression.  Three Al Jazeera 
reporters were sentenced to seven to ten years in prison for 
publishing “false news.”288  After Egypt received intense 
international condemnation,289 Egypt’s Court of Cassation in 
January 2015 ordered a retrial.290  After the journalists spent over a 
year in prison, the authorities released two of the journalists on bond 
and deported the third.  On retrial, the remaining two were again 
convicted and sentenced to three years in prison.291  Twenty-two 
Egyptian journalists remain incarcerated.292  In addition, seventy-
five Egyptian judges signed a petition on July 24, 2013, protesting 
the overthrow of President Morsi, dissolution of the Parliament’s 
upper house (the Shura Council) and the closure of news media 
outlets.293  All seventy-five judges were placed in disciplinary 
proceedings and referred for “criminal charges under the Penal 
code.” 294  In August 2015, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi issued a new 
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 288 For the full charges against the journalists, see Hany Georgy, Memorandum 
Concerning the Trial of Al-Jazeera Journalists, EGYPT ST. INFO. SERV. (July 14, 2014), 
http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticleNews.aspx?ArtID=78769#.VdU
BrFO6fR0 [http://perma.cc/G5U8-P72R]. 
 289 David D. Kirkpatrick, Egyptian Court Orders Release of 2 Al Jazeera Journalists, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/13/world/middleeast/ 
egyptian-court-orders-release-of-2-al-jazeera-journalists.html [http://perma.cc/66Z5-
5W98]; see also ICJ Joins in Call for Attention to Deteriorating Human Rights Situation 
in Egypt, INT’L COMMISSION JURISTS (Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.icj.org/icj-joins-in-call-
for-attention-to-deteriorating-human-rights-situation-in-egypt/ [http://perma.cc/6KWS-
FFTC] (noting, among other human rights violations, Egypt’s need for immediate and 
unconditional release of persons detained solely for peacefully exercising their rights to 
freedom of expression, assembly and association). 
 290 Kareem Fahim, Al Jazeera Journalists Sentenced to 3 Years in Prison in Egypt, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/30/world/middleeast/al-
jazeera-journalists-sentenced-to-3-years-in-prison-in-egypt.html [http://perma.cc/VWU9-
F4LT]. 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id.; Roy Greenslade, Four More Journalists Arrested in Egypt, Where 18 Are 
Already in Jail, GUARDIAN (July 7, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/media/ 
greenslade/2015/jul/07/four-more-journalists-arrested-in-egypt-where-18-are-already-in-
jail [http://perma.cc/YC5T-X3J6]. 
 293 Egypt: Military, Government and Politicized Judiciary Are Crushing Freedom of 
Expression, supra note 286. 
 294 Id.  Many of the judges were given travel bans.  Id.  An Egyptian disciplinary court 
subsequently required forty-one judges to retire.  See Egypt Sacks 41 Judges for 
Supporting the Brotherhood, EGYPT INDEP. (Mar. 14, 2015), http://www.egypt 
374 N.C. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XLI 
counterterrorism law that further restricts freedom of expression by 
expanding the government’s surveillance powers and by penalizing 
journalists for contradicting official accounts of militant attacks.295 
In the two years since the military regime overthrew President 
Morsi, “more than 40,000 people have been arrested.”296  The 
arrestees do include primarily Muslim Brotherhood members, but 
also journalists and secular, pro-democracy protesters.297  
Furthermore “[t]orture and other ill-treatment of detainees remained 
routine and was committed with impunity.”298 
On June 3, 2014, General el-Sisi won the “pro forma” 
presidential election;299 less than a majority of registered voters 
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N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/ 10/02/world/middleeast/egypt-
seizes-newspapers-to-censor-an-article.html [http://perma.cc/FZE6-Y2G7] (“[T]he 
censorship is another example of constriction of news media freedom since the military 
takeover in July 2013 that brought Mr. Sisi to power.”). 
 295 Kareem Fahim & Merna Thomas, Egypt Widens Government Power with New 
Anti-Terrorism Law, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/ 
world/middleeast/egypt-widens-government-power-with-new-anti-terrorism-law.html 
[http://perma.cc/WD7Z-TNKZ]; Egypt Imposes Anti-Terror Law That Punishes ‘False’ 
Reporting of Attacks, GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ 
2015/aug/17/egyptian-president-ratifies-law-to-punish-false-reporting-of-terror-attacks 
[http://perma.cc/B78Z-DZU9]. 
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2, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/kerry-visits-egypt-to-strengthen-ties-as 
-repression-is-growing/2015/08/02/f59e9eaa-36d2-11e5-ab7b-6416d97c73c2_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/GFJ7-C68H]. 
 297 Id. 
 298 AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2014/15: THE STATE OF THE 
WORLD’S HUMAN RIGHTS 137 (2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ 
pol10/0001/2015/en/ [http://perma.cc/FW3H-NWX4]; see Jared Maslin, Human Rights 
Groups Fear for Rule of Law in Egypt After Lawyer Dies in Custody, GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/12/human-rights-groups-fear-rule-
law-egypt-karim-hamdy-dies-police-custody [http://perma.cc/B68R-DZXE] (observing 
signs of torture in lawyer who died in police custody); 2,600 Reportedly Killed in 18 
Months Since Overthrow of Mohamed Morsi, GUARDIAN (May 31, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/31/at-least-2600-reportedly-killed-in-egyp 
t-following-overthrow-of-mohamed-morsi [http://perma.cc/GJC7-HNWY] (noting that 
police stations are filled to 400% capacity and prisons to 160% and deaths of at least 36 in 
police detention); 3 Members of Egypt Council for Human Rights Say Arab Prison Report 
‘Distorts Reality,’ AHRAM ONLINE (Sept. 2, 2015), http://english.ahram.org.eg/ 
NewsContent/1/64/139528/Egypt/Politics-/-members-of-Egypt-Council-for-Human-Righ 
ts-say-Aqr.aspx [http://perma.cc/L4JT-GB4A]. 
 299 Mayy el Sheikh, Egypt: Sisi Wins with 97 Percent, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2014), 
2016 A CALL TO STRENGTHEN THE RULE OF LAW 375 
went to the polls to cast their ballots.300  But the legitimacy of the 
election had already been eroded by the military’s overthrowing the 
freely and fairly democratically elected president, by banning the 
opposition party under the pretext of fighting terrorism, by 
imprisoning the overthrown President and Muslim Brotherhood 
leadership and charging them with capital offenses under an 
overbroad statute, and by extensively employing excessive, deadly 
force against Muslim Brotherhood protesters. 
IV. International Law As a Guide to Counter-Terrorism Policy 
and Practice 
A. The Emerging Norm Prohibiting Military Overthrow of 
Democratic Governments 
The international community has increasingly condemned 
military coups d’état against democratic governments.301  There is 
an evolving norm of customary international law rendering such 
overthrows unlawful.302  Some argue that no state responsibility 
arises from a coup, so the practical effect of the international 
community’s declaration of illegality is more political and moral 
than firmly based on legal principle.303  On the other hand, often a 




 300 Id. (“[T]urnout was about 47 percent of eligible voters, far short of what he had 
sought to prove he had a mandate to lead and less than the 52 percent who voted in the 
2012 election won by Muhammad Morsi, whom Mr. Sisi overthrew last year.”).  El-Sisi 
received 97 percent of the vote.  Id. 
 301 Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. 
INT’L. L. 46 (1992); see also Gregory H. Fox, Internationalizing National Politics: Lessons 
for International Organizations, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 265, 265 (2007) (“While human 
rights regimes had long discredited the idea that the international community should never 
be involved in matters of national politics, the move toward democratic legitimacy took 
intervention a giant step further.”).  On the other hand, the military overthrowing a 
dictatorial government may be legitimate.  Ozan O. Varol, The Democratic Coup d’État, 
53 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 291 (2012). 
 302 Franck, supra note 301, at 49–54.  For an authoritative analysis of the requirements 
to establish a custom—sufficiently dense state practice and a recognition that the practice 
has crystallized into a legal obligation—see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27). 
 303 Jean D’Aspremont, Responsibility for Coups d’Etat in International Law, 18 TUL. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 451, 454–65 (2010). 
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government coming into power.304  Sometimes, the United Nations 
has refused to give to the coup regime that state’s seat if the United 
Nations, has condemned the overthrow of a democratically elected 
leader305 and even has taken direct legal action against the coup 
government.306  Sometimes, other international organizations 
similarly opposed such coups.307  Such refusals have both political 
and legal consequences.  For example, a United States’ statute 
prohibits the United States from providing any aid to a country 
“whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military 
coup or decree.” 308 
 
 304 See, e.g., M.J. Peterson, Recognition of Governments Should Not Be Abolished, 77 
AM. J. INT’L L. 31, 38 (1983) (citing the move to democratic legitimism by the five Central 
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this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the 
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Doc. A/10842 (June 30, 2009), http://www.un.org/press/en/2009/ga10842.doc.htm 
[http://perma.cc/VK6F-8KTJ] (condemning the Honduras coup d’état and demanding 
immediate, unconditional restoration of the democratically elected president). 
 307 See, e.g., ROLAND I. PERUSSE, HAITIAN DEMOCRACY RESTORED 1991–1995, at 22–
23 (1995) (condemning the overthrow of Haitian President Aristede and demanding his 
restoration as President). 
 308 See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations 
Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-107, 110 Stat. 704, 723.  The Turkish Parliament, Afghan Senate, 
and Nigerian government condemned the Egyptian coup, but Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon merely called for the quick return to democratic rule.  See, e.g., Turkish Parliament 
Condemns “Military Coup” in Egypt, ANADOLU AGENCY (July 4, 2013), 
http://www.aa.com.tr/en/rss/200438--turkish-parliament-condemns-egypts-military-coup 
[http://perma.cc/XKW7-GBMY] (“Turkish parliament’s Human Rights Committee on 
Thursday issued a joint statement, condemning the military coup in Egypt.”); Senate 
Condemns Coup Against Mursi, PAJHWOK AFGHAN NEWS (July 7, 2013), 
http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2013/07/07/senate-condemns-coup-against-mursi [http:// 
perma.cc/3XQH-XNV9] (“The Senate on Sunday condemned the ouster of Egyptian 
president Mohammad Mursi as an act against international law and democratic norms, 
calling the move an insult to the public mandate.”); Nigeria Condemns Egypt Coup, 
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (July 5, 2013), http://big5.zlb.gov.cn/gate/big5/ 
news.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2013-07/06/c_124966206.htm [http://perma.cc/ 
CQZ3-PD7G] (“The Nigerian government has condemned the military takeover in Egypt, 
saying that the unfortunate development is a gross violation of the Constitutive Act of the 
2016 A CALL TO STRENGTHEN THE RULE OF LAW 377 
The overthrow of Mohammad Morsi resembles in some respects 
the overthrow of Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristede.  In both 
cases, the military overthrew democratically elected presidents.309  
In both cases, each president was the first democratically elected 
president in his country’s history.310  In Egypt, Morsi was the first 
civilian ever to be the head of state.311  There are significant 
differences, however.  The U.N. General Assembly condemned the 
military junta’s ousting Aristede, and the Security Council, acting 
under Chapter VII, authorized the use of armed force to restore 
Aristede to power (which the U.S. military helped bring about).312  
Neither the U.N. General Assembly nor the Security Council has 
condemned the Egyptian military’s overthrowing Morsi.  Perhaps 
the difference in the two leaders’ popularity explains the different 
international reactions.  Aristede was elected with sixty-seven 
percent of the popular vote313 whereas Morsi was elected by 51.7 
percent.314  After his landslide victory, Aristede remained popular, 
but Morsi later became deeply unpopular.315 
 
African Union, which prohibits unconstitutional change of government.”). 
 309 David D. Kirkpatrick, Army Ousts Egyptian President; Morsi Is Taken into 
Military Custody, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/ 
world/middleeast/egypt.html [http://perma.cc/8UK9-KQY9]; see also Timothy Guzman, 
Haiti’s Struggle for Freedom: U.S. Imperialism, Minustah and the Overthrow of Jean-
Bertrand Aristede, GLOBAL RES. (Jan. 11, 2015), http://www.globalresearch.ca/haitis-
struggle-for-freedom-us-imperialism-minustah-and-the-overthrow-of-jean-bertrand-aristi 
de/5316972 [http://perma.cc/9XXQ-GCG5] (describing the September 29, 1991 coup 
d’état in Haiti). 
 310 MICHAEL R. HALL, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF HAITI 8 (2012). 
 311 Sherif Tarek, Morsi Declared Egypt’s First Civilian President, AHRAM ONLINE 
(June 24, 2012), http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/36/0/46061/Presidential-
elections-/0/Morsi-declared-Egypts-first-civilian-president,--bu.aspx [http://perma.cc/ 
KYV4-64FU]. 
 312 See Paul Quinn, Officials Report on Haiti: Talbott Tells Congress Elections, 
Judicial System Due by Feb. of ‘96, BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 25, 1995), 
https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-8317395.html [https://perma.cc/6H3Z-3UFG].  One 
colleague notes that the difference between the Haiti overthrow and the Morsi overthrow 
may have been that the United States’ interests differed in the two cases.  Comments of 
Professor Sahar Aziz (2015) (on file with author). 
 313 HALL, supra note 310. 
 314 David D. Kirkpatrick, Named Egypt’s Winner, Islamist Makes History, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/world/middleeast/mohamed-morsi-
of-muslim-brotherhood-declared-as-egypts-president.html [http://perma.cc/KLH7-
9VV2]. 
 315 See GӦTZ-DIETRICH OPITZ, HAITIAN REFUGEES FORCED TO RETURN: 
TRANSNATIONALISM AND STATE POLITICS, 1991–1994, at 296 (2004) (noting that 
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If coups against democratically elected leaders can ever be 
justified, the overthrow of President Manuel Zelaya of Honduras 
was far more defensible than that of President Morsi.  President 
Zelaya’s overthrow, however, was widely condemned by the 
international community and by international organizations.316  
There, the Honduran President sought to hold a referendum to gain 
the people’s approval to establish a constituent assembly to rewrite 
the Honduran constitution to extend his term of office.  A Honduran 
court issued an injunction against President Zelaya, ordering him to 
stop the referendum’s holding, reasoning that such a referendum 
violated the Honduran constitution.317  President Zelaya ignored the 
order and a later Honduran Supreme Court order to the same 
effect.318  The Honduran Supreme Court then ordered Zelaya’s 
arrest.319  The military stormed the President’s palace at dawn, took 
him to the airport and put him on a plane to Costa Rica.320  
Apparently, the Honduran Supreme Court and Congress feared that 
Zelaya was trying to establish a Hugo-Chavez-type regime in 
Honduras.321 
The Honduran Constitution (like the Egyptian Constitution then 
in effect) lacked a provision for impeaching the president.322  The 
Honduran coup had the bipartisan support of the Honduran 
Congress, including Zelaya’s own Liberal Party, the presidential 
candidates of Zelaya’s party, and the opposition national party.323  
 
Aristede’s popularity ballooned after the coup). 
 316 Elisabeth Malkin, Honduran President Is Ousted in Coup, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/29/world/americas/29honduras.html [http:// 
perma.cc/9NQW-EED8]. 
 317 Frank Walsh, The Honduran Constitution Is Not a Suicide Pact: The Legality of 
Honduran President Manuel Zelaya’s Removal, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 339, 341–43 
(2010). 
 318 Id. at 341–48. 
 319 Id. at 345–46. 
 320 Id. at 342.  One commentator noted that Zelaya posed a threat to then-existing elite 
power structure.  THOMAS M. LEONARD, THE HISTORY OF HONDURAS 176 (2011) 
(“President Zelaya stood a threat to Honduras’ existing order of elite domination of the 
government, economy, and society.”). 
 321 GREG BENCHWICK, HONDURAS AND THE BAY ISLANDS 34 (2010). 
 322 See Mariano Castillo, Years After Crisis, Honduras Considers Impeachment, CNN 
(Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/23/world/americas/honduras-impeachment/ 
[http://perma.cc/SC3V-XTBU]. 
 323 Thomas Legler, Learning the Hard Way: Defending Democracy in Honduras, 65 
INT’L J. 601, 606–07 (2010).  For an opposing view, see Ronald W. Cox, The U.S. Role in 
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Furthermore, the coup had the support “of the supreme court, the 
office of the attorney general, the supreme electoral tribunal, . . . the 
national human rights ombudsman[,] . . . the senior hierarchy of the 
Catholic Church . . . as well as Protestant evangelical groups.”324  
Had there been a provision for impeachment in the Honduran 
Constitution, it is likely that Zelaya would have been impeached. 
Nevertheless, the ousting of President Zelaya was condemned 
by the U.N. General Assembly, by the Organization of American 
States, by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, by 
Latin American and other countries, and by the United States.325  
The World Bank indicated it was suspending a $400 million loan to 
Honduras.326  The European Union, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the Central American Integration System, and 
the Central American Bank of Economic Integration also sanctioned 
Honduras.327 
Despite Zelaya’s unconstitutional efforts to hold the referendum 
and extend his power in office, the international community viewed 
his ouster as an illegal coup d’état.  Morsi’s attempts to rule by 
decree until the proposed Egyptian constitution was approved 
appear certainly no worse than what Zelaya was trying to 
accomplish.328  Given the extreme decision of a Mubarak-appointed 
 
the Honduran Coup of 2009, VIEW FROM LEFT FIELD (Sept. 9, 2014), 
http://www.viewfromleftfield.com/the-us-role-in-the-honduran-coup-of-2009/ [http:// 
perma.cc/8T89-A9EQ] (noting that U.S. business groups supported the coup and that 
President Obama never classified the coup as a “coup” under U.S. statutes, which 
otherwise would have prohibited the United States from giving aid to Honduras). 
 324 Legler, supra note 323. 
 325 Douglass Cassel, Honduras: Coup d’Etat in Constitutional Clothing?—Revision, 
13 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS 1, 2 (2009) (“[President Zelaya’s] removal and 
replacement were swiftly denounced as a coup d’état by governments throughout the 
region, including by U.S. President Obama, and by the United Nations General Assembly, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and the General Assembly of the 
Organization of American States (OAS).  Invoking the InterAmerican Democratic Charter, 
the OAS General Assembly termed the coup an unconstitutional alteration of the 
democratic order, thus triggering the suspension of Honduras from participation in the 
OAS.” (internal citation omitted)); see also Deadline for Honduras over Leader, BBC 
(July 1, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8127867.stm [http://perma.cc/ 97CA-
FHYG] (noting the suspension of joint military operations between the United States and 
Honduras). 
 326 Deadline for Honduras over Leader, supra note 325. 
 327 See Legler, supra note 323, at 601–04. 
 328 See HOWARD J. WIARDA, DISPATCHES FROM THE FRONTLINES: STUDIES IN FOREIGN 
POLICY, COMPARATIVE POLITICS, AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 64 (2014). 
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court to dissolve the Islamic-dominated lower house of 
parliament,329 Morsi’s decision to refuse to follow judicial orders 
was understandable if neither legal nor wise.  Given the composition 
of the Egyptian parliament, it is far less likely that Morsi would have 
been impeached had there been a constitutional impeachment 
provision available (and had the lower house of parliament not been 
dissolved).  Unlike Zelaya’s party, the Muslim Brotherhood 
certainly did not approve the coup.330  In addition, the constitution 
was not suspended in Honduras, but it was suspended in Egypt.331  
“In Egypt, it’s crystal clear that the military holds power.  In the 
case of Honduras, the military never really had power, but rather 
was acting on behalf of the Supreme Court, Congress, and leaders 
within Mr. Zelaya’s own Liberal Party.”332  Lastly, the Honduran 
coup aftermath pales in comparison with the Egyptian military coup 
leaders’ violent repression of the Muslim Brotherhood, banning the 
organization and imprisoning all its leadership, and the harsh 
penalties it has visited on those Brotherhood members who have 
had blatantly unfair, summary mass trials.333 
 
 329 On the other hand, the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court had also dissolved 
the Parliament in 1987 and 1990.  Egypt Court Orders Dissolving of Parliament, AL 
JAZEERA (June 14, 2012), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/06/ 
2012614124538532758.html [http://perma.cc/G5V6-B9MD]; see also Sahar F. Aziz, 
Bringing Down an Uprising: Egypt’s Stillborn Revolution, 30 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2014). 
 330 Benjamin Wedeman et al., Egypt’s Forces Move Against Muslim Brotherhood; 
Attacks Against Police Reported, CNN (July 4, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2013/07/04/world/meast/egypt-coup/ [http://perma.cc/LFR2-GEY7] (“On its website, the 
Muslim Brotherhood declared, ‘our unequivocal rejection of the military coup against the 
elected president and the will of the nation and refuse to participate in any action with the 
authority that stole the power and dealt violently with peaceful demonstrators.’”). 
 331 Egypt Military: President Morsi Ousted, Constitution Suspended, CBS NEWS (July 
3, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/egypt-military-president-morsi-ousted-
constitution-suspended/ [http://perma.cc/8KJK-4MZB]. 
 332 Marco Caceres, Egypt: Another Good Coup, HUFFINGTON POST (July 4, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marco-caceres/egypt-the-good-coup_b_3542784 [http:// 
perma.cc/3VU9-FX4H].  General el-Sisi, the coup leader, was ultimately elected president, 
but serves essentially as a military leader head of state.  See Egypt’s Sisi Signs Law 
Defining “Terrorist Entities,” AHRAM ONLINE (Feb. 24, 2015), 
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/123810/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-Sisi-signs-
law-defining-terrorist-entities.aspx [http://perma.cc/A6VG-A4LW] (reporting that 
President el-Sisi personally issued a new law “broadly defining ‘terrorist entities,’” or 
individuals who, among other things, “through any means inside or outside the country 
seek to call for the disabling of laws or prevent state institutions or public authorities from 
functioning” (internal citation omitted)). 
 333 See Egypt Unfair Trial, Death Sentences Make Mockery of Justice, AMNESTY 
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The international community, however, generally failed to 
condemn the Egyptian military coup itself.334  The evidence of the 
military’s aiding and abetting the protests against Morsi did not 
come out until months after the coup, and the delay may have 
dampened any outcry.335  Ironically, arresting rather than letting 
Morsi leave the country may also have contributed to the softer 
protest against the coup.  (Both Aristede and Zelaya addressed the 
U.N. General Assembly following their coups, successfully urging 
the Assembly to condemn each of their military overthrows.)  One 
hopes that the lack of protest did not stem from bias in the West 
against fundamentalist ideology or from distorted generalizations of 
Muslims, based on terrorist activity by a small fragment of the 
Muslim population.336  Muslim fundamentalists, whom the Muslim 
Brotherhood represents, certainly do not enjoy unanimous approval 
in the Muslim world.  But assuming we accept that customary 
international law against the military overthrow of democratically 
elected governments is emerging, it is hard to deny that the Egyptian 




INT’L (Apr. 28, 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/04/egypt-unfair-
trial-death-sentences-make-mockery-justice/ [https://perma.cc/4HCM-9Q3D]. 
 334 Morsi’s Punishment Is a Crime, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 21, 2015), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/04/morsi-punishment-crime-sisi-egypt-
150421113902012.html [http://perma.cc/WLC3-D8JQ].  In addition, Egypt was recently 
elected by African countries to one of the non-permanent seats in the U.N. Security 
Council, perhaps owing in part to most African governments likewise perpetrating 
systematic human rights violations.  See Somini Sengupta, Ukraine and Japan Among 
Latest Members of U.N. Security Council, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2015), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/10/16/world/ukraine-and-japan-among-latest-members-of-un-se 
curity-council.html [http://perma.cc/P2BN-R4J5]; see, e.g., Africa Human Rights, 
AMNESTY INT’L, http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/africa [http://perma.cc/ 
MR7H-F2HT] (last visited Nov. 12, 2015); Freedom in the World 2015, FREEDOM HOUSE 
(Jan. 28, 2015), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-
2015#.Vi5Ic9KrQps [http://perma.cc/MGW5-FH5C] (“Ratings for the Middle East and 
North Africa region were the worst in the world, followed by Eurasia.  Syria, a dictatorship 
mired in civil war and ethnic division and facing uncontrolled terrorism, received the 
lowest Freedom in the World score of any country in over a decade.”). 
 335 Id. 
 336 Egypt’s Invisible Protesters, One Year After Coup, MIDDLE E. EYE (July 4, 2014), 
http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/egypt-s-invisible-protesters-one-year-after-coup-
10908636261090863626p [http://perma.cc/QLR8-PVGM]. 
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B. Human Rights Law and the Aftermath of the Military 
Coup 
Aside from the emerging illegality of overthrowing a 
democratic government, the military in carrying out a coup and in 
solidifying their power usually violates international human rights 
law and sometimes, if a civil war breaks out, international 
humanitarian law as well.337  As noted above, the Egyptian military 
regime has engaged in repeated, serious human rights violations 
since deposing President Morsi.338  In this period, the Egyptian 
government has continuously violated customary international law 
and numerous provisions of the foundational human rights treaty, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
(“ICCPR”).339  Under the ICCPR, each state party is required to 
respect the rights of “all individuals” without “distinction of any 
kind, such as . . . religion or other opinion.”340  The ICCPR also 
guarantees each citizen the right to “take part in the conduct of 
public affairs . . . through freely chosen representatives.”341  The 
Egyptian military coup itself arguably violates the latter article.  By 
overthrowing Morsi and by dissolving the Parliament, the military 
(and an Egyptian court) directly interfered with Muslim 
Brotherhood members’ right to “take part in the conduct of public 
affairs . . . through freely chosen representatives.”342  Banning the 
Muslim Brotherhood altogether on frivolous grounds 
unquestionably amounted to discrimination on the basis of 
 
 337 See Denmark, Norway & Sweden v. Greece, 1969 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. (Eur. 
Comm’n of H.R.) 586 (finding flagrant violations of human rights committed by the Greek 
military regime after conducting a coup d’état). 
 338 See Egypt Military Court Sentences 253 to Life in Prison in Absentia, ASWAT 
MASRIYA (Aug. 11, 2015), http://en.aswatmasriya.com/news/view.aspx?id=19878b57-
f813-49b2-ad6b-8b44b4d09be1 [http://perma.cc/2CWZ-78Z2]. 
 339 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter 
ICCPR].  Egypt is also party to the U.N. Convention against Torture, the U.N. Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, to Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  
Ratification of Human Rights Treaties—Egypt, U. MINN. HUM. RTS. LIBR., 
http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ratification-egypt.html [http://perma.cc/6JKF-
MUCV] (last visited Aug. 31, 2015). 
 340 ICCPR, supra note 339, art. 2(1). 
 341 Id. art. 25(a). 
 342 See id. art. 25(a). 
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“religion, political or other opinion”343 and again directly interfered 
with the right of Muslim Brotherhood members to participate in 
government “through freely chosen representatives.”344 
The ICCPR also requires each state party to guarantee the 
freedoms of expression, of assembly, and of association.345  By 
imprisoning and convicting journalists for reporting events that the 
government does not like exposed, the Egyptian government again 
has violated its obligation to respect freedom of expression.346  The 
government’s repression of peaceful demonstrations constitutes an 
egregious violation of both the freedom of assembly and of 
association. 
Under Article 6 of the ICCPR, the Egyptian authorities are 
expressly prohibited from arbitrarily taking the life of their own 
nationals or anyone else.347  Law enforcement personnel may use 
deadly force only when their lives or others’ are in imminent danger 
of death or serious bodily harm.348  By aiming at the head and chest 
of demonstrators and killing hundreds of them, the Egyptian 
Security Forces engaged in “arbitrary” taking of life in violation of 
article 6 of the ICCPR and of the customary law obligation to 
minimize the use of deadly force.349 
Although the death penalty is not yet banned under international 
 
 343 Cf. Metro Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 860 (state’s 
refusal to permit breakaway Orthodox Christian Church to operate violated “freedom of 
religion” guarantee of the European Human Rights Convention). 
 344 ICCPR, supra note 339, art. 25(a). 
 345 Id. arts. 19–21. 
 346 Article 19(2) of the ICCPR guarantees freedom of expression, but article 19(3) 
allows governments to limit the freedom of expression on, among other grounds, “[f]or the 
protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or 
morals.”  Id. art. 19(3) (emphasis added).  Protection of national security or public order 
does not extend to imprisoning journalists for accurately reporting government shooting 
and killing demonstrators.  See Sarah Joseph, A Rights Analysis of the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, 5 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 57, 78–79 (1999); Amit Mukherjee, 
International Protection of Journalists: Problem, Practice, and Prospects, 11 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 339, 356 (1994). 
 347 ICCPR, supra note 339, art. 6(1). 
 348 See Eighth Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 
Aug. 27–Sept. 7, 1990, Basic Principles for the Use of Force and Firearms by Law 
Enforcement Officials, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 (“Law enforcement officials 
shall not use firearms against persons except in self-defen[s]e or defen[s]e of others against 
the imminent threat of death or serious injury . . . .”). 
 349 See id. ¶ 5; ICCPR, supra note 339, art. 6(1) (“[N]o one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his life.”).  
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law, individuals subject to the death penalty are entitled to a fair 
trial.350  Holding summary mass trials in capital cases makes a 
mockery of this obligation.351  Egypt’s campaign of terror against 
the Muslim Brotherhood and its arrest of thousands without 
reasonable cause and subsequently failing to provide them a fair 
trial likewise violate both the ICCPR and customary international 
law.352 
Furthermore, Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibits torture and cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment.353  Like the right to life, this 
obligation is strict.354  States may not derogate from it even in cases 
of public emergency.355  By increasing the operation of its already 
busy torture chambers,356 Egypt has regularly violated  Article 7, an 
equivalent bar under the Torture Convention, and peremptory 
 
 350 See ICCPR, supra note 339, arts. 4(2), 6(1), 6(2), 9.  Article 6 is non-derogable.  
Id. art. 4(2). 
 351 See Egypt: U.N. Experts “Outraged” at Confirmation of 183 Death Sentences, 
UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14801&Lang
ID=E [http://perma.cc/3KBL-QC77] (“We are shocked by the repeated and deliberate use 
of mass death sentences . . . .  We are deeply concerned that the courts have become 
instrumental in the arbitrary and politically motivated prosecutions by the State, which 
may also be discriminatory against people on the basis of religion or belief.”). 
 352 See ICCPR, supra note 339, arts. 9, 19; G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights arts. 3, 9, 10 (Dec. 10, 1948) (guaranteeing fair trial in 
criminal proceedings) [hereinafter UDHR]; Egypt: ICJ Condemns Further Mass Death 
Sentences, supra note 272 (“Trials with heavy-handed sentences should not be used to 
repress and intimidate political opponents.  The climate in Egypt is currently one where 
individuals are being prosecuted and sentenced for exercising their right of freedom of 
association and assembly.”); FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 167, at 6 (noting freedom 
deterioration in Egypt). 
 353 See ICCPR, supra note 339, art. 7. 
 354 See id. art. 4(2). 
 355 See id. 
 356 See Walaa Ramadan, Torture in Egyptian Prisons Was Once a Cause for Revolt, 
Now It’s Met by Silence, MEMO MIDDLE E. MONITOR (Aug. 6, 2014), https:// 
www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/africa/13272-torture-in-egyptianegyptian-prisons-
was-once-a-cause-for-revolt-now-its-met-by-silence [https://perma.cc/749D-W9RR] 
(citing Wiki Thawra reporting that “at least 80 detainees have died” in Egyptian prisons 
from July 3, 2013 to May 2014 and large numbers tortured); Jesse Rosenfeld, Egypt’s 
Black Site Torture Camps, DAILY BEAST (June 19, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/ 
articles/2014/06/19/egypt-s-black-site-torture-camps.html [http://perma.cc/ATM8-
QKRQ] (describing the “black site prisons” used by the Egyptian army to torture young 
protestors). 
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norms of customary international law.357 
C. International Law, Colonization, Annexation, 
Discrimination, and the West 
Aside from the illegality of the coup and widespread 
international human rights violations perpetrated by the Egyptian 
military, the West’s 200 year encounter with Egypt would now 
violate fundamental principles of international law.  Having 
experienced the horror of two world wars, the framers of the U.N. 
Charter outlawed the use or threatened use of armed force except in 
self-defense or under U.N. Security Council authorization: “All 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat 
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations.”358 
The most important world treaty with 193 states parties, the 
U.N. Charter thus prohibits aggressive warfare.359  While not 
abolishing colonies as such, the Charter makes it very hard for 
 
 357 See Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the 
Committee Against Torture: Egypt on its 29th Sess., Dec. 23, 2002, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/CR/29/4 (“Express[ing] particular concern at the widespread evidence of torture 
and ill-treatment in administrative premises under the control of the State Security 
Investigation Department.”). 
 357 The civil and political rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) are generally considered to have crystallized into customary international 
law.  See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881–82 (2d Cir. 1980); UDHR, supra note 
352, art. 3 (“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.”); id. art. 5 (“No 
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”); id. art. 9 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or 
exile.”); id. art. 11 (“[T]he right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to 
law in a public trial at which he [the accused] has had all the guarantees necessary for his 
defence.”); id. art. 19 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this 
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”); id. art. 20 
(“(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.  (2) No one 
may be compelled to belong to an association.”). 
 358 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.  Article 51 of the Charter permits the use of proportional 
force in the case of self-defense.  See id. art. 51.  Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter authorizes 
the U.N. Security Council to call on members to use armed force in cases where there is a 
“threat to the peace.”  See id. arts. 39, 42 (authorizing U.N. Security Council to act). 
 359 The widely accepted U.N. General Assembly Resolution on Aggression fleshes 
out the meaning of article 2(4) of the Charter and includes, among others, invasion or 
attack, bombardment, blockade, and use of irregular or proxy forces.  See G.A. Res. 3314 
(XXIX), Definition of Aggression art. 3 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
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powerful states to legally establish new colonies.360  Although the 
Charter has not stopped warfare, with a few significant 
exceptions,361 it has stopped more powerful states from annexing 
territory of less powerful states.  When combined with the ICCPR 
and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (“ESCR”), both of which expressly recognize the right of 
self-determination, the U.N. Charter forbids acquisition of new 
colonies.362  The Charter also established a trustee system to 
encourage, more effectively than the League of Nations mandate 
system, colony-holding states to relinquish their long-held 
colonies.363 
 
 360 The legal regime before the U.N. Charter endorsed colonization.  For example, 
especially in the nineteenth century, “[g]iven the military weakness of the non-European 
states, and the absence of any legal limitations on a state’s ability to commence a war, it 
was inevitable that European empires would expand by the conquest of large parts of Asia 
and Africa.”  ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 83 (2004); see also Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: 
Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L 
L.J. 1, 50 n.175 (1999) (“Conquest seems to have been officially outlawed in contemporary 
international law as a means of acquiring title to territory . . . .”). 
 361 China’s conquering and annexing Tibet, and Russia’s annexing Crimea last year 
are two of the starkest examples of illegal annexations.  See, e.g., Robert D. Sloane, The 
Changing Face of Recognition in International Law: A Case Study of Tibet, 16 EMORY 
INT’L L. REV. 107, 131 (2002); Gaetano Pentassuglia, Putin Should Know That Crimea Is 
Not Kosovo When It Comes to Self-Determination, CONVERSATION (Mar. 31, 2014), http:// 
theconversation.com/putin-should-know-that-crimea-is-not-kosovo-when-it-comes-to-sel 
f-determination-24916 [http://perma.cc/QN2Z-N39N].  Russia has argued, among other 
things, that the doctrine of self-determination justified the annexation of Crimea, an 
argument rarely accepted in the case of so-called external self-determination.  See id. 
(reporting Putin arguing that self-determination justified the annexation).  Cf. Shahrough 
Akhavi, Muslim Perspectives on the Invasion of Iraq, in ENEMY COMBATANTS, 
TERRORISM, AND ARMED CONFLICT LAW: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 37, 41 (David K. Linnan 
ed., 2008) (discussing the Islamic world’s negative perception of the invasion of Iraq as 
an unjustified external intervention). 
 362 See ICCPR, supra note 339 (“1. All peoples have the right of self-determination.  
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development . . . .  3. The States Parties to the present 
Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-
Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-
determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter 
of the United Nations.” (emphasis added)); G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 1 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter 
ESCR]. 
 363 GEORGE THULLEN, PROBLEMS OF THE TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM: A STUDY OF 
POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR IN THE UNITED NATIONS 88 (1964).  The tidal wave of the 
independence movement in the 1960’s played a greater role.  Id. at 120. 
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Had it been in force at the time, the U.N. Charter, for example 
would have prohibited Napoleon from conquering Egypt in 1798, 
would probably have prohibited Muhammad Ali from taking over 
Egypt in 1801 and 1807, and would probably have prohibited 
England from colonizing Egypt in 1882.  The Charter did prohibit 
the use of force to retake the Suez Canal in 1956.364  The Egyptian 
encounter with the West produced an unhealthy alchemy, 
contributing to the growth of authoritarian Egyptian regimes, to the 
conflict between Muslim secularists and Muslim fundamentalists, 
and to the creation of rebels of different ideological and religious 
bents, striving to throw off the colonial yoke and the repressive 
regimes which developed in the colonial governments’ place. 
International law does not fully provide an answer to Egypt’s 
troubles or to the West’s and Russia’s struggle with Islamic 
terrorism.  International law, however, can help policy makers better 
understand the forces driving Islamic terrorism and guide the West, 
in general, and the United States in particular towards more 
effective and less violent counter-terrorism policies and practices.  
Under international law, States are responsible only for their acts 
that were illegal at the time the state committed them.  Absent 
express agreement to the contrary, international law does not apply 
retrospectively.  The International Law Commission’s draft articles 
on state responsibility so provide, “An act of a State does not 
constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the State is 
bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs.”365  
Called the doctrine on intertemporal law, this principle applies even 
to acts that subsequently have become proscribed under a 
peremptory norm of international law.366  The judge in the Island of 
Palmas arbitration explained, “A juridical fact must be appreciated 
in light of the law contemporary with it and not the law in force at 
 
 364 See G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 359. 
 365 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts arts. 
13, 57, Rep. on its 53d Sess., Apr. 1–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc.A/56/10 
(2001) (emphasis added); see also JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 131 (2002) (expounding on the 
principle that States are not responsible for the “retrospective application of international 
law”). 
 366 See CRAWFORD, supra note 365; T.O. Elias, The Doctrine of Intertemporal Law, 
74 AM. J. INT’L L. 285 (1980) (describing the concept of intertemporal law and its historical 
underpinnings). 
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the time when a dispute in regard to it arises.”367  It has been held, 
for example, that British interception of foreign slave traders’ ships 
in the nineteenth century violated international law when the British 
had done so before the slave trade “had been ‘prohibited.’”368  
African-Americans suffered under the “separate but equal doctrine” 
before the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 
declared the doctrine unconstitutional.369  Likewise, the pain, 
humiliation, and resentment engendered by conquest, colonization, 
and accompanying racial discrimination370 had been just as sharply 
felt by the people experiencing these practices before the 
international community formally outlawed them.371 
 
 367 Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Netherlands), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 845 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928) 
(emphasis added); see also MCDONNELL, supra note 7, at 280 (describing how the doctrine 
of intertemporal law solves problems of past annexation). 
 368 CRAWFORD, supra note 365 (citations omitted).  Historical wrongs may be 
judicially cognizable only under narrow circumstances.  See Dinah Shelton, 
Intergenerational Equity, in SOLIDARITY: A STRUCTURAL PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 123, 136 (Rudiger Wolfrum & Chie Kojima eds., 2010) (arguing for reparations for 
historical violations); Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. Rep. 12, 39 (Oct. 
16) (discussing the decolonization of Western Sahara and finding no ties of territorial 
sovereignty); Moiwana Village v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 142, ¶ 43 (June 15, 2005) 
(concluding that the massacre of a village occurring before Suriname had ratified the 
American Convention on Human Rights was nevertheless actionable after ratification on 
a continuing wrong theory).    
 369 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 370 See AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, BRINGING THEM HOME: NATIONAL 
INQUIRY INTO THE SEPARATION OF ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER CHILDREN 
FROM THEIR FAMILIES ch. 14 (1997) (finding that under international law, from 
approximately 1946 the policies of forcible removal amount to genocide, and from 1950 
the continuation of distinct laws for Indigenous children was racially discriminatory). 
 371 For historical reasons, the Islamic world did not embrace the scientific method, 
capitalism, and the industrial revolution.  See Hillel Ofek, Why the Arabic World Turned 
Away from Science, THE NEW ATLANTIS 3, 13–15 (2011).  The West did embrace all these 
things and became both economically and militarily more powerful.  Id. at 18.  In the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire was the world’s superpower.  See 
also Stanford J. Shaw & Gökhan Çetinsaya, Ottoman Empire, OXFORD ISLAMIC STUD. 
ONLINE, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0611 [http://perma.cc/ 
CX92-GCT3] (last visited Nov. 12, 2015) (describing the Ottoman Empire’s rise to world 
power).  It thus must have been particularly humiliating to have been outdone by the 
Europeans, which had formerly been second rate powers.  Id.  That is how American auto 
manufacturers must have felt when the Japanese began to make better cars than Detroit 
and dominate the American market.  It must have been like many Americans might feel if 
Mexico were ever to invade and conquer the United States, take back Texas, New Mexico, 
Arizona, and California and subject the rest of the United States to Mexican rule. 
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Although under no legal obligation to make reparation in such 
circumstances, states may do so.  “[A] state may agree to 
compensate for damage caused as a result of conduct which was not 
a breach of any international obligation at the time it was 
committed.”372  Although international law prohibiting racial and 
nationality discrimination was not clearly recognized until after 
World War II,373 the United States compensated Japanese 
Americans and Japanese nationals who were detained and held in 
internment camps during that conflict.374  Again largely on moral 
grounds, the United States has compensated foreign nationals in 
other situations in which international law did not render the United 
States legally responsible for the wrong.375  Other states have done 
 
 372 CRAWFORD, supra 365, at 132–33 (quoting Commentaries).  The rule of 
intertemporal law likewise applies to states and religious organizations that discriminated 
against Jews for over two millennia.  One would imagine, however, that religious 
organizations, if not states, would make reparation as a moral duty.  The reparations 
movement has had some success in obtaining restitution and other settlement for Holocaust 
victims, but even by 1939, war crimes and genocide were implicitly recognized as 
violations of international law, so there really is no retroactivity problem. 
 373 The U.N. Charter, not open for signature until 1945, provides that “United Nations 
shall promote: . . . universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” and that “[a]ll 
members shall pledge themselves to take joint and separate action” to achieve the same.  
See U.N. Charter arts. 55, 56 (emphasis added).  The seminal California Supreme Court 
case of Sei Fujii v. State, implicitly concluded that the “promote” and “pledge” language 
was not sufficiently definite to create legally binding “rules of law.”  38 Cal. 2d 719, 722 
(1952) (noting that the language of the U.N. charter in article 55 was too vague to be 
binding).  The International Court of Justice, however, did conclude that this language was 
strong enough to render illegal South Africa’s then system of apartheid.  See Legal 
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 78, ¶ 131 (June 21) (concluding the 
government policy of discrimination in South Africa violated the language of the U.N. 
Charter).  The anti-discrimination provisions of The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, passed without dissent, by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948, did not, however, 
crystallize into custom until sometime later. 
 374 See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1989b-1 to -9 (1988) (authorizing 
survivors of Japanese internment be compensated in the amount of $20,000 each); 
Motoyoshi v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 45, 48 (1995) (discussing the $20,000 
compensation under the Civil Liberties Act). 
 375 Most notably, United States has compensated civilians who have suffered from 
American military operations in wartime in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other theatres even 
absent any showing that the United States was legally responsible.  See AMSTERDAM 
INTERNATIONAL LAW CLINIC, MONETARY PAYMENTS FOR CIVILIAN HARM IN 
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PRACTICE 13–16 (2013), http://www.uva.nl/ 
binaries/content/assets/subsites/amsterdam-international-law-clinic/monetary-payements-
report.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZE3Q-39DN].  The U.S. practice dates back to World War I.  
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so as well.376  For example, New Zealand set up a program “to 
address the wrongs committed by the British government during its 
colonial rule against the Maori during the late 1800s.”377  Thus in 
dealing with such wrongs, for most claimants, “reparation is a moral 
issue involving a formal acknowledgement of historical wrong, 
recognition of continuing injury, and commitment to redress.”378 
Since the end of World War II, the international community has 
outlawed state conquest, colonization and systematic racial 
discrimination.379  Should the international community now ignore 
 
See Sarah Holewinski, Making Amends: A New Expectation for Civilian Losses in Armed 
Conflict, in CIVILIANS AND MODERN WAR: ARMED CONFLICT AND THE IDEOLOGY OF 
VIOLENCE 317, 322–23 (2012) (dating the concept of making amends back to WWI).  
Winning (or at least not losing) hearts and minds by “making amends” may also play into 
the U.S. decision to compensate.  See id. at 320–21 (detailing the reasons the U.S. makes 
amends); Sahr Muhammedally, Civilians War Victims Receive Recognition in U.S. Law, 
CTR. FOR CIVILIANS CONFLICT (Apr. 3, 2014), http://civiliansinconflict.org/ 
resources/news/civilian-war-victims-receive-recognition-in-us-law [http://perma.cc/ 
CB74-J6MY] (explaining the importance of making amends); 2 HERSH LAUTERPACHT, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS: THE LAW OF PEACE 230, 232 (1975) 
(quoting with approval case of Hardman (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), R.I.A.A. 25, 26 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 
1923) (“Although there is no legal obligation to act in that way, there may be a moral duty 
which cannot be covered by law, because it is grounded on an inmost sense of human 
assistance [and the ability of the nation to pay].”)). 
 376 For example, Georgia paid $250,000,000 to South Ossetians who suffered 
property damage in the 2009 conflict with Russia.  See Holewinski, supra note 375, at 325.  
In 2009, the commander of the African Union Mission in Somalia “offered $7,600 to local 
traders for the camels that his troops accidentally killed in Mogadishu.”  Id. 
 377 James Thomas & David Brunsma, Bringing down the House: Reparations, 
Universal Morality, Human Rights and Social Justice, in GLOBALIZATION AND AMERICA: 
RACE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INEQUALITY 65, 70 (Angela Hattery et al. eds., 2008). 
 378 Shelton, supra note 368 (emphasis added).  Former colonial states providing 
“development aid” to their former colonies can be viewed as providing reparation for 
historical wrongs.  See JEREMY SARKIN, COLONIAL GENOCIDE AND REPARATIONS CLAIMS 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY 193–94 (2009). 
 379 See ICCPR, supra note 339.  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
(“UDHR”) which was passed by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948 without a dissenting 
vote, expressly prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, religion, nationality, and 
former colonial status of territory.  “Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colo[]r, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.  Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, 
jurisdictional, or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, 
whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing, or under any other limitation of 
sovereignty.”  UDHR, supra note 352, art. 2 (emphasis added) (prohibiting discrimination 
on the basis of race).  The prohibitions of this most famous General Assembly resolution 
were subsequently codified in numerous multi-lateral treaties, including among others, the 
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the wrongs that individuals and peoples were subjected to before 
these three, related practices were legally banned?  This article 
contends both as a matter of enlightened self-interest and as a matter 
of elemental morality and justice that policy makers must take into 
account these past wrongs endured by all peoples in the Middle East 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171; 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(“CERD”), Dec. 16, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243; and Convention 
on the Rights of the Child art. 2, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.  Adopted in 1965 by 
unanimous vote of the General Assembly, the International Convention to Eliminate Race 
Discrimination has been, as of this writing, signed by eighty-eight nations with 177 states 
parties.  Status of Treaties, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/ 
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en [http:// 
perma.cc/M8M4-B2FV] (last visited Oct. 25, 2015) (listing parties who have signed 
CERD).  The Convention prohibits “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 
based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect 
of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any 
other field of public life.”  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination, art. 1(1) Dec. 16, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD] 
(emphasis added) (defining racial discrimination).  Furthermore, the United States 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations concludes that the prohibition on “systematic 
racial discrimination” rises to the level of a peremptory norm of international law.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 702(f) (AM. LAW INST. 1990) (setting 
forth that a state violates international law if it promotes or “condones” racial 
discrimination).  The Restatement notes that systematic discrimination on the basis of 
religion enjoys similar status.  Id. cmt. j; see also General Recommendation XIII on the 
Training of Law Enforcement Officials in the Protection of Human Rights, Comm. on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 42d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/42/18 (Mar. 16, 1993).  See 
generally Maria V. Morris, Racial Profiling and International Human Rights Law: Illegal 
Discrimination in the United States, 15 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 207 (2001) (discussing the 
deleterious effects of racial profiling on minorities).  International Tribunals have ruled 
that racial discrimination violates international law and the proscription of such 
discrimination has become a peremptory norm of international law.  See, e.g., Juridical 
Condition and Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) No. 18 (Sept. 17, 2003) (“The international community is unanimous in 
considering that the prohibition of racial discrimination and of practices directly associated 
with it is an obligation erga omnes.”).  The European Court of Human Rights has ruled 
that the state has an obligation to investigate whether racism motivated state officials in 
using excessive force in killing members of a minority group, suspected of a criminal 
offense.  See Nachova v. Bulg., 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 40, http://www.echr.coe.int/ 
Documents/Reports_Recueil_2005-VII.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3HM-SLNZ] (upholding 
the lower court, “Where there is suspicion that racial attitudes induced a violent act it is 
particularly important that the official investigation is pursued with vigour and 
impartiality, having regard to the need to reassert continuously society’s condemnation of 
racism and ethnic hatred and to maintain the confidence of minorities in the ability of the 
authorities to protect them from the threat of racist violence”). 
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and the Islamic World, particularly at the hands of the West and 
Russia.380 
V. United States Flawed Response to the Coup d’État 
By essentially ratifying, if not initially supporting the Egyptian 
military’s coup d’état, the United States falls into the same narrative 
that probably led to the September 11 attacks.381  The West’s 
exploiting Arab and Muslim countries by colonizing them 
demonstrates at the very least the callous indifference of the West 
to the plight of Arab and Muslim peoples.  The United States has 
shown indifference if not outright hostility to emerging democratic 
institutions in the Islamic world.  By supporting authoritarian rulers 
from the Shah of Iran, to Saddam Hussein, to Hosni Mubarak, to 
Saudi Arabia’s House of Saud, to the draconian heads of the tiny oil 
emirates, the United States has implicitly helped these regimes to 
smother the possible emergence of democratic movements in their 
countries.382  As observed above, the United States brought about 
the coup that deposed the democratically-elected Prime Minister of 
Iran in 1953.383  The United States supported the Algerian military’s 
coup on the eve of elections that the Muslim Brotherhood 
candidates almost certainly would have won in 1991.384  
 
 380 On Russian colonization of Muslim countries, see COOPER & YUE, supra note 6. 
 381 Secretary of State John Kerry visited President el-Sisi the day after an Egyptian 
court ratified the death sentences of 183 Muslim Brotherhood members, including 
Muhammad Badie, the spiritual guide of the Brotherhood.  See Ricardo Gonzalez, Kerry 
Supports Egypt’s Sisi, President and Leader of Coup d’État, EL PAIS (June 22, 2014), 
http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2014/06/22/actualidad/1403465904_897931
.html [http://perma.cc/WD8E-MNYK]. 
 382 Secretary of State James Schlesinger testified before Congress as follows: “Do we 
seriously want to change the institutions of Saudi Arabia?  The brief answer is no; over the 
years we have sought to preserve those institutions, sometimes in preference to more 
democratic forces coursing throughout the region.”  See Hashemi, supra note 167, at 42 
(citation omitted). 
 383 Dan Merica & Jason Hanna, In Declassified Document CIA Acknowledges Role in 
‘53 Iran Coup, CNN (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/19/politics/cia-iran-
1953-coup/index.html [http://perma.cc/43M7-WLKH]. 
 384 Beverly Milton-Edwards, The Democratic Freedom Deficit in the Middle East, in 
IRAQ, DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE MUSLIM WORLD 130, 141(Ali Paya & John L. 
Esposito eds., 2011) (“This ambiguity of ‘double-standards’ in western democracy 
promotion is keenly felt elsewhere across the Middle East; countless press commentaries 
in the Arabic press opine at US and Western support more generally for some democratic 
regimes and movements in the region and their opposition and desire to damage others.  
Democracy in the Middle East was supposed to be the launch-pad for a new orientation of 
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Furthermore, the United States did little to advance respect for 
democratic rule in Egypt while its client Mubarak for nearly three 
decades ruthlessly dealt with Brotherhood members and 
Brotherhood candidates for office.385  Geopolitical interests in oil, 
in “stability,” in preventing communism were made far higher 
priorities than fostering the fundamental human rights for the people 
living in this region.386 
United States’ interests in having a strong relationship with 
Egypt are no less critical today.  While the Suez Canal may have 
been colonial Britain’s “highway to India,” it is now the U.S. 
warships’ highway to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, Iran, and Somalia.387  These countries are all critical to 
current United States armed conflicts or to the so-called war against 
terrorism, or both.388  Egypt allows United States warships to cut the 
 
American foreign policy in the Bush administration.  American national interest was 
defined as being well-served in terms of combating Islamic terrorist extremism if the 
region’s authoritarian and anti-democratic regimes were expunged and substituted with 
moderate pro-western regimes.  The difficulty with regime change and transition in the 
region, however, has been that electorates are opting for Islamist parties and movements 
in the process.  These movements, albeit mostly moderate, articulate a concept of political 
reform from within an alternate framework to the secular West.  Convergence is unlikely, 
but accommodation is possible.” (emphasis added)). 
 385 For fiscal year 2014, the total amount of aid was $1.3 billion.  See Background 
Briefing en Route to Cairo, Egypt, U.S. DEP’T STATE (June 21, 2014), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/06/228225.htm [http://perma.cc/CE8P-RHXF].  
Approximately, $575 million had already been delivered, but approximately $75 million 
had been held back.  See id. 
 386 See David D. Kirkpatrick et al., How American Hopes for a Deal Were Undercut, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/world/middleeast/ 
pressure-by-us-failed-to-sway-egypts-leaders.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [http:// 
perma.cc/NYL4-JDDU]; Paul R. Williams & Colleen Popken, U.S. Foreign Policy and 
the Arab Spring: Ten Short Term Lessons Learned, 41 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 47, 47 
(2012). 
 387 Afghanistan, of course, is landlocked, but the nearest port is in Pakistan through 
which the United States has sent most of its heavy equipment and other materiel for 
Afghanistan.  See Jim Michaels, U.S. Military Needs Egypt for Access to Critical Area, 
USA TODAY (Aug. 17, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/08/17/ 
egypt-morsi-obama-hagel-gulf-heritage-brookings/2665903/ [http://perma.cc/JLE2-
W8EA] (explaining the geographical importance of the Suez Canal to the U.S.). 
 388 For a map of the Middle East illustrating the importance of free passage through 
the Suez Canal, see Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection: Middle East Maps, U. TEX. 
LIBR., http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east.html [https://perma.cc/E8CH-X8G2] 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2015). 
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line of vessels waiting to pass through the Canal.389  Furthermore, 
Egypt’s strategic location makes it part of an ideal United States air 
highway to all these countries.  Lastly, Egypt is one of only two 
Arab countries to have signed a peace treaty with Israel, and, as the 
most populous Arab state and a next-door neighbor, is critical to 
Israeli security.390 
The United States’ tepidly protesting the planned coup d’état 
and ultimately ratifying it can be explained in part by these interests.  
Immediately after the coup on July 3, 2013, President Obama 
refused to characterize the military takeover as a “coup,”391 and 
refused to stop the $1.5 billion in aid to Egypt as federal law would 
otherwise have required.392  His response to the military 
overthrowing Egypt’s first freely and fairly elected president was to 
suspend delivery of four F-16 fighter jets.393  Even that suspension 
was reversed less than ten days after the coup.394  Only months later 
did the Obama administration put a “temporary freeze” on some 
armaments scheduled for delivery to Egypt.395  The administration 
 
 389 Thom Shanker & Eric Schmitt, Ties with Egypt Army Constrain Washington, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/17/world/middleeast/us-
officials-fear-losing-an-eager-ally-in-the-egyptian-military.html [http://perma.cc/A4XN-
6NWY]. 
 390 In testimony before Congress, a State Department official succinctly summed up 
U.S. interests in Egypt.  See A. Elizabeth Jones, Acting Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Near 
E. Affairs, Statement Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee (Oct. 29, 2013), 
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/215965.htm [http://perma.cc/7K8J-3SJ9] (“Promoting 
a stable and prosperous Egypt, securing regional peace and maintaining peace with Israel, 
and countering extremism and terrorism throughout the region.  This partnership has 
brought the United States significant benefits: . . . easy transit through the Suez Canal; 
military overflights that facilitate our activities; and the counterterrorism and counter 
proliferation gains that come from Egypt’s efforts to control its borders with Gaza and 
security challenge countries like Libya.”). 
 391 Secretary of State John Kerry went so far to say that the military was “restoring 
democracy” in carrying out the coup.  Michael Gordon & Kareem Fahim, Kerry Says 
Egypt’s Military Was ‘Restoring Democracy’ in Ousting Morsi, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/world/middleeast/egypt-warns-morsi-supp 
orters-to-end-protests.html [http://perma.cc/RB9P-EF4B]; Kirkpatrick, supra note 283. 
 392 See Background Briefing en Route to Cairo, Egypt, supra note 385. 
 393 Kirkpatrick et al., supra note 386. 
 394 Richard Spencer, U.S. Still Planning to Send F16 Jets to Egypt, DAILY TELEGRAPH 
(July 12, 2013), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/ 
egypt/10172850/US-still-planning-to-send-F16-jets-to-Egypt.html [http://perma.cc/ 
U6UG-H4R4]. 
 395 See Michael Gordon & Mark Landler, In Crackdown Response, U.S. Temporarily 
Freezes Some Arms to Egypt, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
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subsequently lifted the freeze on most of the armaments.396  
Primarily Republican members of Congress but Democratic 
members as well criticized the President even for imposing these 
sanctions on the Egyptian military.397 
In two separate incidents in July 2013, the Egyptian military 
killed more than sixty peaceful protesters in the first incident and 
more than seventy peaceful protesters in the second, yet the Obama 
administration did not suspend aid.398  Following the Egyptian 
military’s Tiananmen-Square-type attack against Muslim 
Brotherhood protesters on August 14, 2013, the Obama 
administration attempted to cool the increased violence, but the 
 
10/10/world/middleeast/obama-military-aid-to-egypt.html?pagewanted=all [http:// 
perma.cc/8CT3-9ENU] (“To signal its displeasure at the Egyptian military’s bloody 
crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, officials said, the United States would withhold 
the delivery of several big-ticket items, including Apache attack helicopters, Harpoon 
missiles, M1-A1 tank parts and F-16 warplanes, as well as $260 million for the general 
Egyptian budget.”); U.S. Unlocks Military Aid to Egypt, Backing President Sisi, BBC (June 
22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27961933 [http://perma.cc/ 
TN43-JST6] (“But in a sign of how the administration is balancing its interests, senior 
officials said the United States would continue aid for counter- terrorism programs as well 
as for Egypt’s efforts to protect its borders and secure Sinai, which has become a haven 
for extremists.”).  Hardly making a reference to Egypt’s human rights violations, Secretary 
of State John Kerry addressed in March 2015 an economic conference seeking to assist the 
el-Sisi government and Egypt.  Sarah El Deeb & Brian Rohan, Egypt Rakes in Promises 
of Billions in Gulf Aid, YAHOO NEWS! (Mar. 13, 2015), http://news.yahoo.com/egypts-el-
sissi-inaugurates-three-day-economic-conference-143327308--finance.html [http:// 
perma.cc/9RQL-4JGJ] (reporting Kerry’s support for continuing aid to Egypt). 
 396 Peter Baker, Obama Removes Weapon Freeze Against Egypt, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/world/middleeast/obama-lifts-arms-
freeze-against-egypt.html [http://perma.cc/3P9K-XV97]. 
 397 U.S. Congress Slams Military Aid Cuts to Egypt, MEMO MIDDLE E. MONITOR 
(Oct. 30, 2013), https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/americas/8052-us-congress-
slams-military-aid-cuts-to-egypt [http://perma.cc/9QY3-5MZY].  On the other hand, 
standing apart from the Republican leadership, Sens. John McCain and Lindsey Graham 
sharply criticized the Obama administration for failing to cut off some substantial aid to 
Egypt.  John McCain & Lindsey Graham, Opinion, Cut Off Aid to Egypt, WASH. POST 
(July 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/john-mccain-and-lindsey-
graham-cut-off-aid-to-egypt/2013/07/12/5850a1f4-eb19-11e2-a301-ea5a8116d211_story 
.html [http://perma.cc/88LE-3TX7] (arguing for the termination of all aid to Egypt until 
its government makes reforms). 
 398 Kareem Fehim, Crackdown in Egypt Kills Islamists as They Protest, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/world/middleeast/egypt.html 
[http://perma.cc/Q4CW-T4ZS] (noting that “[t]he tactics—many were killed [by the 
Egyptian security forces] with gunshot wounds to the head or the chest—suggested that 
Egypt’s security services felt no need to show any restraint”). 
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Egyptian military regime, “coldly calculated,” that the Americans 
would not stop the aid, and ignored the Americans efforts.399  The 
Egyptian generals calculated correctly: President Obama suspended 
a joint training exercise, but not the $1.5 billion in assistance.400 
For Fiscal Year 2014, the Obama Administration informed 
Congress of its intent to spend (give to Egypt) all $1.3 billion in 
appropriated Egyptian military aid and did so in two $650 million 
tranches in April 2014 and January 2015, respectively,401 and in 
March 2015 announced the delivery of withheld weapons,402 
 
 399 Kirkpatrick et al., supra note 386 (“All of the efforts of the United States 
government, all the cajoling, the veiled threats, the high-level envoys from Washington 
and the 17 personal phone calls by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, failed to forestall the 
worst political bloodletting in modern Egyptian history.  The generals in Cairo felt free to 
ignore the Americans first on the prisoner release and then on the statement, in a cold-eyed 
calculation that they would not pay a significant cost—a conclusion bolstered when 
President Obama responded by canceling a joint military exercise but not $1.5 billion in 
annual aid.”); see also Kirkpatrick, supra note 283 and accompanying text (detailing the 
Egyptian military’s August 14, 2013, attack). 
 400 Kirkpatrick et al., supra note 386 (“[T]he Israelis, Saudis and other Arab allies 
have lobbied [President Obama] to go easy on the generals in the interest of thwarting what 
they see as the larger and more insidious Islamist threat.”); Steve Kenny, Egypt: U.S. to 
Deliver Helicopters, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/ 
world/middleeast/egypt-us-to-deliver-helicopters.html [http://perma.cc/8NRR-K4MG].  
Secretary of State John Kerry also informed the Egyptian government that it was meeting 
its commitments under the Camp David Accords, thereby entitling Egypt to additional aid.  
Id.  It is submitted, however, that long-term Israeli security would be better served by 
having an Islamic democratic regime than a secular military one that has violently put 
down the democratic Islamic movement, sparking increased terrorism.  TAHRIR INST. FOR 
MIDDLE E. POLICY, EGYPT SECURITY WATCH – MONTHLY BRIEFING: FEBRUARY 2015, at 1 
(2015), http://timep.org/esw/articles-analysis/egypt-security-watch-monthly-briefing-5-
february-2015/ [http://perma.cc/8LZS-CQMM] (noting the increased number of terror 
attacks in Egypt).  The United States also decided to lift its suspended delivery of ten 
Apache Attack helicopters to Egypt.  Sandra Maler, U.S. to Deliver 10 Apache Helicopters 
to Egypt – Pentagon, YAHOO! NEWS (Sept. 20, 2014), http://news.yahoo.com/u-s-deliver-
10-apache-helicopters-egypt-pentagon-024754535--finance.html [https://perma.cc/ 
4WZV-RY39]. 
 401 SHARP, supra note 194, at 3.  Senator Leahy had initially blocked the April 2014 
$650 million tranche, but, according to Secretary of State Kerry, all but $78 million of that 
tranche was released by June 2014.  James Rosen, Kerry Seeks to Nudge Egypt’s New 
President Toward Reforms on Cairo Visit, FOX NEWS (June 22, 2014), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/06/22/kerry-seeks-to-nudge-egypt-new-president 
-toward-reforms-on-cairo-visit/ [http://perma.cc/G3LP-39E7] (reporting on the amount of 
aid to Egypt and the tranche). 
 402 David D. Kirkpatrick, U.S. to Decide Soon on Restoring Military Aid to Egypt, 
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/15/world/middleeast/ 
kerry-promises-decisions-soon-on-iran-deal-and-restoration-of-military-aid-to-
2016 A CALL TO STRENGTHEN THE RULE OF LAW 397 
including delivery of F-16 aircraft, Harpoon missiles, and M1A1 
Abram tanks.403 
Furthermore, within a week of the coup, Saudi Arabia, together 
with Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, pledged to give the 
Egyptian military regime twelve billion dollars, “dwarf[ing]” that 
of the United States ($1.5 billion) and the EU ($1.3 billion) 
combined.404  These Middle East regional players, all of which are 
authoritarian regimes with abysmal human rights records,405 have 
 
egypt.html [http://perma.cc/CB7U-VT5Y] (noting also that the United States was 
withholding $700 million in military aid from Egypt but subsequently released it). 
 403 Peter Baker, Obama Removes Weapons Freeze Against Egypt, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/world/middleeast/obama-lifts-arms-
freeze-against-egypt.html [http://perma.cc/K8Z3-EU7V] (asserting the White House did 
not claim “credible progress”).  Congress has enacted legislation requiring that Egypt 
fulfill human rights and democratic conditions before receiving aid, but has also granted 
the Secretary of State the right to waive such conditions in the interest of U.S. security.  
SHARP, supra note 194, at 4 (giving the Secretary of State the right to bypass).  President 
Obama, however, did not claim that Egypt “had made ‘credible progress’ toward 
democracy[,]” citing “the interest in U.S. national security.”  Baker, supra.  The Obama 
administration has criticized the Egyptian government, but is essentially fully funding it.  
David D. Kirkpatrick, Obama Administration Criticizes Egypt in Report to 
Congress, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/08/world/ 
middleeast/obama-administration-criticizes-egypt-in-report-to-congress.html [http:// 
perma.cc/V5WP-NNA4]; SHARP, supra note 193, at 26 (“For FY2016, both House and 
Senate draft foreign operations appropriations bills (H.R. 2772 and S. 1725 respectively) 
would provide the President’s full request for Egypt of up to $1.3 billion in FMF [Foreign 
Military Financing] and $150 million in ESF [Economic Support Funds].”). 
 404 Rod Norland, Saudi Arabia Promises to Aid Egypt’s Regime, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 
19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-vows-to-
back-egypts-rulers.html [http://perma.cc/MF6L-LZRF].  The package consists of $5 
billion from Saudi Arabia, $4 billion from Kuwait, and $3 billion from UAE.  Id.  Israel 
also supported the Egyptian military regime.  Id. “Saudi Arabia, which itself is a close ally 
of Washington, has not only undermined Western efforts to press for compromise, but has 
also revealed diminished U.S. influence across the Arab world.  The United States and 
Europe have been unable to convince Cairo—or to persuade Riyadh to press the generals 
toward moderation.”  Id.  “‘The Saudi monarchy is absolutely afraid of an Islamist-based 
democracy movement,’ said Amanda E. Rogers, a lecturer in Arabic at Emory University 
in Atlanta and contributor to Muftah, a blog about the Middle East and North Africa.”  Id. 
 405 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 
2013: UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (2013) (“The three most significant human rights problems 
were citizens’ inability to change their government; limitations on citizens’ civil liberties 
(including the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, and internet use); and 
arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detentions, and lengthy pretrial detentions.”); U.S. DEP’T 
STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2013: BAHRAIN (2013) 
(“The most serious human rights problems included citizens’ inability to change their 
government peacefully; arrest and detention of protesters on vague charges, in some cases 
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reduced the ability of the West—assuming it had the political will—
to have softened the military’s repression of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.406 
The coup thus placed the Obama administration on the horns of 
a dilemma: “[A.] [R]isk a partnership that been the bedrock of 
Middle East peace for [thirty-five] years or [B.] [S]tand by while 
longtime allies try to hold on to power by mowing down 
opponents.”407  The administration with the Republican leadership’s 
implicit agreement has chosen option “B.”408 
Conclusion 
The Ottoman Empire’s weakness led to its downfall and to the 
West’s colonization of Muslim countries.  The colonization of 
Egypt by Britain led to a tradition of autocratic secular military 
 
leading to their torture in detention; and lack of due process in trials of political and human 
rights activists, medical personnel, teachers, and students, with some trials resulting in 
harsh sentences.”); Qatar UN Review: Crucial Reforms Needed to Protect Women and 
Migrant Workers, AMNESTY INT’L (May 6, 2014), http://www.amnesty.ca/news/news-
releases/qatar-un-review-crucial-reforms-needed-to-protect-women-and-migrant-workers 
[http://perma.cc/2DZG-EFWD] (discussing Qatar’s lack of human rights protections for 
migrant workers, domestic violence victims, and persons tortured in detention centers); 
Annual Report: Kuwait 2013, AMNESTY INT’L (May 23, 2013), 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/annual-report-kuwait-2013 [http://perma.cc/ 
5A55-JDJH] (discussing exploitation of migration workers and Kuwait’s use of excessive 
force against demonstrators); FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 167 (rating the four small Gulf 
States “not free,” except for Kuwait, which earned a “part free” rating).  Saudi Arabia was 
among the ten worst countries in the world for human rights.  Id. 
 406 Vladimir Putin visited Egypt for a two-day visit on February 9, 2015, to send a 
message to the United States that “their foreign policies are not to be dictated by others.”  
Patrick Kingsley, Vladimir Putin’s Egypt Visit Sends Message to U.S., GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/09/vladimir-putin-egypt-visit-
message-us-russia?CMP=share_btn_link [http://perma.cc/FX3J-CGD9]. 
 407 Kirkpatrick et al., supra note 386; see also Emad Mekay, Military Oppression 
Sows Seeds of Violence in Egypt, INT’L B. ASS’N (2013), 
http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=5fc6c631-a517-4d67-b30e-ca97a9 
4c1b5b [http://perma.cc/GB3E-SNTE] (“Al-Qaeda’s ideology of violence as the only 
means of change has now received a new lease of life.”); Jared Maslin, Cairo Citizens 
Caught Between Isis Violence and Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s Draconian Security Crackdowns, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/23/cairo-
citizens-isis-violence-sisi-draconian-security-crackdowns [http://perma.cc/9J6E-TEJW] 
(noting a “culture of fear growing in Egypt”); Kareem Fahim & David D. Kirkpatrick, 
Jihadist Attacks on Egypt Grow Fiercer, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2015), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/02/world/middleeast/sinai-isis-attack.html?_r=0 [http:// 
perma.cc/PN7U-RBT6]. 
 408 Kirkpatrick et al., supra note 386. 
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leaders including Muhammed Ali, Gamal Abdul Nasser, Anwar Al-
Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, and Abdul Fattah el-Sisi.  That colonization, 
its aftermath, and Kemal Ataturk’s related aggressive secularism 
gave rise to an Islamic fundamentalist reaction, creating Hasan al 
Banna, his Muslim Brotherhood and his progeny: Sayyid al-Qutb, 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Osama bin Laden, and their movements, 
including al-Qaeda and arguably ISIS.409  Consequently, we in the 
West have to be particularly sensitive to policies and practices that 
perpetuate this vicious cycle. 
Unfortunately, the United States began to take on the face of a 
Middle East colonial power at the end of World War II.  U.S. policy 
concentrated on continuing the supply of oil and containing 
communism.  With a few exceptions,410 the United States displayed 
little concern for the human rights of Arab and Muslim people or 
for the growth of democratic movements and institutions in the Arab 
and Islamic worlds.411 
Ireland was Britain’s first colony.  The Irish suffered 
discrimination at the hands of the British and British settlers for 
centuries.  The Irish have a saying, “The British never remember, 
the Irish never forget.”412  Americans tend to forget our supporting 
repressive regimes in the Middle East for decades, our thwarting 
democratic movements in that region, and in particular our giving 
 
 409 ISIS does trace itself to Muhammed ibn Abd ab-Wahhab, and his “austere 
interpretation of Islam,” known as Wahhabism, coming from 18th century Saudi Arabia.  
David D. Kirkpatrick, Extremist Group’s Harsh Brand of Islam Has Roots in Austere 
Saudi Creed, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/world/ 
middleeast/isis-abu-bakr-baghdadi-caliph-wahhabi.html [http://perma.cc/MSP7-F6YS].  
The British support of Abdul Aziz ibn-Saud during World War I, however, helped him 
emerge as the ruler of Saudi Arabia, and with him, Wahhabism.  Saudi Arabia’s oil wealth 
has helped Wahhabism spread around the globe.  ANDERSON, supra note 182 (describing 
Abdul Aziz ibn-Saud’s rise to power). 
 410 Some exceptions include the United States opposing the British and French 1956 
war against Egypt’s nationalizing the Suez Canal and the 1999 NATO intervention in 
Kosovo on behalf of the Albanian Kosovars.  See, e.g., PEEVERS, supra note 84; Kosovo 
Conflict: Balkan History, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/event/ 
Kosovo-conflict [http://perma.cc/TUB2-PPR2] (last visited May 1, 2015). 
 411 See Mark P. Lagon, Promoting Human Rights: Is U.S. Consistency Desirable or 
Possible?  A Markets and Democracy Brief, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Oct. 2011), http:// 
www.cfr.org/human-rights/promoting-human-rights-us-consistency-desirable-possible/p 
26228 [http://perma.cc/M4FP-UFTB]. 
 412 Daniel Shriver, Where and When in Political Life Is Justice Served by Forgiveness, 
in BURYING THE PAST: MAKING PEACE AND DOING JUSTICE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT 25, 31 
(Nigel Biggar ed., 2003). 
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Mubarak billions of dollars while he ruled Egypt by decree and 
routinely tortured political opponents including Muslim 
Brotherhood members.  Arabs and Muslims throughout the world 
generally never forget these things.  Certainly, they are not forgotten 
by Islamic fundamentalists.413 
Because the West and Russia have exploited Muslim peoples 
and contributed to the rise both of autocratic leaders and extreme 
fundamentalists, the West and Russia have a moral, if not strictly 
legal obligation not only to help Muslim countries economically, 
but also to further a peaceful and democratic resolution of the issues 
that such Western and Russian policies and practices brought about.  
Achieving this latter objective requires greater resort to tough 
diplomacy than to military force.  Ratifying the Egyptian military 
coup constitutes a failure of the United States and the West in 
general to take a peaceful, non-violent path towards resolving the 
challenge of Islamic terrorism.  Denying Egypt’s Islamic 
fundamentalists their fairly won presidential election and 
parliamentary elections414 feeds into the propaganda of the 
extremists, silences moderates who wish to follow the rule of law, 
and strengthens those espousing the hardest line toward the West.415  
By implicitly endorsing the Egyptian military’s repression of 
generally peaceful protesters and political opponents, we also make 
more likely revenge attacks against the ‘far enemy’—the United 
States—by jihadists outraged by the Egyptian military’s onslaught 
 
 413 Perhaps not coincidentally, the West and Russia have been responsible for more 
than millennia-old discrimination against Jews, ultimately resulting in the Holocaust.  
Under the same reasoning, the West and Russia bear a moral, if not legal responsibility for 
resolving the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. 
 414 See Bassiouni, Egypt Update Number 16, supra note 223 (criticizing the election 
law as being biased in favor of political parties’ candidates).  But see Aziz, supra note 198, 
at 4 (criticizing the election laws but noting that “Egyptians viewed with suspicion the 
Supreme Constitutional Court’s June 12, 2012, ruling calling for the dissolution of a 
Muslim dominated parliament”). 
 415 Mara Revkin, Brotherly Love–Why Sisi’s Win Is Good for Al Qaeda, FOREIGN AFF. 
(May 29, 2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/egypt/2014-05-29/brotherly-love 
[https://perma.cc/3ZEG-PDBS]; The Egyptian Coup, the United States, and the Threat of 
Terrorism, INT’L L. PROF BLOG (Sept. 11, 2013), http://lawprofessors. 
typepad.com/international_law/2013/09/guest-editorial-.html [http://perma.cc/QMK3-
29YJ] (arguing that the United States implicitly supporting the coup has fashioned her 
against radical Islam); Tom McDonnell, Letter to the Editor, U.S. Policy Toward Egypt, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/opinion/us-policy-
toward-egypt.html [http://perma.cc/D5YT-YLE7] (criticizing U.S. policy toward Egypt). 
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against the Muslim Brotherhood.416  Furthermore, such endorsement 
of the coup and its aftermath makes President Obama’s call for 
democracy and for Muslims to stop ISIS and al-Qaeda extremists417 
appear hypocritical.418 
Admittedly, the Egyptian case has been challenging.  The 
Muslim Brotherhood is an illiberal organization which espouses 
many views most in the West abhor, advocating a strict 
interpretation of sharia law, practicing de jure discrimination 
against women and the LGBT community,419 preaching intolerance 
of other religions, and showing hostility to our ally, Israel.420  Morsi 
 
 416 Ayman al-Zawahiri Says U.S. Behind Coup That Ousted Morsi, GUARDIAN (Aug. 
3, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/03/ayman-zawahiri-coup-
mohamed-morsi [http://perma.cc/W99W-2LJN]. 
 417 President Barack Obama, Remarks by President Obama in Address to the United 
Nations General Assembly (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-offic 
e/2014/09/24/remarks-president-obama-address-united-nations-general-assembly [https:// 
perma.cc/W8LN-YGWZ]. 
 418 President Obama’s recent call for “more democracy” as the chief counter to 
terrorism is unquestionably correct, but his call appears hypocritical given the actions of 
the United States.  See President Barack Obama, Remarks in Closing of the Summit on 
Countering Violent Extremism (Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-off 
ice/2015/02/18/remarks-president-closing-summit-countering-violent-extremism [https:// 
perma.cc/XHH7-LXVK] (“When governments oppress their people, deny human rights, 
stifle dissent or marginalize ethnic and religious groups, favor certain religious groups over 
others, it sows the seeds of extremism and violence.”).  That is precisely what the Egypt 
military has done, with the implicit ratification by the United States. 
 419 See Shadi Hamid, The Brotherhood Will Be Back, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/24/opinion/more-democratic-less-liberal.html [http:// 
perma.cc/26J3-BTMM] (arguing that in a religious society like Egypt, democracy and 
illiberalism go together).  But conditions for the LGBT community may not be that much 
better under the military.  See Patrick Kingsley, Egypt Jails Eight Men After “Gay 
Marriage” Ceremony on Nile, GUARDIAN (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
world/2014/nov/03/egypt-jails-eight-men-gay-marriage-ceremony-nile?CMP=ema_565 
[http://perma.cc/SFB6-25CE] (reporting on Egypt’s treatment of LGBT peoples); ICJ 
Welcomes General Assembly’s Third Committee’s Adoption of Resolution on 
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, INT’L COMMISSION JURISTS (Nov. 21, 
2014), http://www.icj.org/icj-welcomes-general-assemblys-third-committees-adoption-
of-resolution-on-extrajudicial-summary-or-arbitrary-executions/ [http://perma.cc/L8UM-
BPYQ] (noting that the GA resolution “urges state to investigate killings based on 
discriminatory grounds including killings that target people based on their sexual 
orientation or gender identity” and that Egypt proposed an amendment to remove the 
language referring to LGBT persons). 
 420 The Morsi regime, however, abided by the Camp David Accords.  Cf. David M. 
Faris, Deep State, Deep Crisis: Egypt and American Policy, MIDDLE E. POL’Y COUNCIL, 
Winter 2013, at 99, http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/deep-state-
deep-crisis-egypt-and-american-policy [https://perma.cc/T5RJ-4JUX] (stating that Egypt 
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and his Parliament were making a grab for power.  There were 
massive protests against his rule by the secularists with whom the 
West understandably has greater sympathy. 
Yet implicitly backing the military coup undermined one of the 
most fundamental values of all: the rule of law and the peaceful 
electoral process, the minimum requirements for a legitimate 
democracy.  It teaches Islamic fundamentalists that they may 
achieve their aims only by violence, not by the ballot box.421  The 
United States’ failure reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of 
how historical, political, legal, and religious forces created the 
perfect storm that contributed both to 9/11 and to the current 
struggle with Islamic terrorism. 
Granted, the United States has critical foreign policy interests in 
maintaining a close relationship with Egypt.  On the other hand, the 
United States has a critical foreign policy interest in quelling 
international terrorism.422  Propping up dictatorial regimes in the 
Middle East closes off peaceful avenues of protest, forcing people 
wishing to change the regime’s policies to go underground, to join 
or support what the regime will almost certainly label terrorist 
organizations.  By discriminating against Muslim fundamentalists 
and implicitly ratifying the illegal use of force against them, United 
States “play[s] into the hands of the extremists,”423 ultimately 
compelling the United States to resort to military counter-terrorism. 
At a minimum the Obama administration should have cut off 
military aid,424 sought a U.N. Security Council Resolution 
 
had adhered to the Accords). 
 421 See Mekay, supra note 407 (“Al-Qaeda’s ideology of violence as the only means 
of change has now received a new lease of life.”); Revkin, supra note 415 (“Egypt has 
seen a dramatic increase in domestic terrorism with over 300 documented attacks since 
July 2013.”); TAHRIR INST. FOR MIDDLE E. POLICY, supra note 400 (noting increased 
terrorist attacks in Egypt). 
 422 If Egypt is the keystone to peace in the Middle East, and if we assume Egypt will 
turn away from the United States without the annual $1.3 billion in military aid, which the 
United States has provided for more than thirty years, not to mention providing military 
equipment and training for Egyptian officers in that time, then those payments themselves 
are a thin reed on which to base so-called Middle East peace and other critical interests. 
 423 Revkin, supra note 415 (permitting jihadist to demonstrate that violence is the only 
path). 
 424 On the other hand, the administration might have increased earmarked economic 
aid, given the dire state of the Egyptian economy, consistent with the purpose of the 
Special International Security Act of 1979 “in order to promote the economic stability and 
development of [Egypt] and to support the peace process in the Middle East.”  22 U.S.C. 
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condemning the Egyptian government’s use of excessive force 
against those protesting the takeover, and threatened both a travel 
ban on the coup’s leaders and a world boycott of the sale to Egypt 
of military equipment and supplies. 
Despite the ever increasing polarized politics here, Americans 
have deep respect for democracy, the peaceful electoral process, the 
right to protest, to free speech, to fair trial and to other fundamental 
human rights.  Neither the American public nor the American court 
system would ever countenance some judges’ dissolution of the 
United States Congress, or of the authorities’ shooting to kill 
innocent protesters, torturing political opponents, banning the party 
that won the last presidential election, and imprisoning all its 
leaders, not to mention overthrowing the President, throwing him in 
jail in a desert prison, and charging him with a capital offense. 
Our best counter-terrorism policy and practice is to foster 
democratic institutions, the rule of law, and international human 
rights in the Arab and Muslim worlds.425  Implicitly ratifying the 
coup and the Egyptian military’s extreme violence in putting down 
protest eviscerates that policy.426  If we are serious about reducing 
 
§ 3401(b)(3) (2015).  But see Whither American Aid to Egypt, AM. U. CAIRO (Sept. 23, 
2012), http://www.aucegypt.edu/GAPP/casar/Pages/Whither-Economic-Aid-to-Egypt. 
aspx [http://perma.cc/EBC2-FEH6] (discussing U.S. economic aid to Egypt and how it has 
varied from the originally set ratio and quoting Special International Security Assistance 
Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-35); Agreement on the Framework for Peace in the Middle 
East, supra note 194 (setting forth the ratio of aid the U.S. would give to Egypt and Israel).  
In addition, such economic aid should also be sufficiently high (a) to pay for the privilege 
of allowing U.S. warships to cut the line of ships waiting to pass through the Suez Canal 
and (b) to comply with U.S. obligations under the Camp David accords.  See Whither 
American Aid to Egypt, supra.  One could argue that given the $12 billion that Saudi 
Arabia, U.A.E., and Kuwait gave Egypt, cutting off aid would not change the Egyptian 
leadership’s policies.  Id.  On the other hand, such a cut off in military aid would 
unambiguously send a message of support for democratic institutions throughout the 
Muslim world. 
 425 Also fundamental is resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.  See MCDONNELL, 
supra note 7, at 14–16. 
 426 See supra note 418 and accompanying text (noting how the perceived hypocritical 
nature of the administration’s policy and statements).  One study showed that negative 
attitudes towards the United States, after the Egyptian coup, predominated by ten to fifteen 
times more than positive attitudes.  Amaney A. Jamal et al., Anti-Americanism in Arabic 
Twitter Discourses Is Driven by Perceptions of U.S. Impingement in the Region, LSE US 
CENTRE (Mar. 19, 2015), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2015/03/19/anti-americanism-
in-arabic-twitter-discourses-is-driven-by-perceptions-of-u-s-impingement-in-the-region/ 
[http://perma.cc/T3Q4-JN7D] (describing change in negative posts towards the United 
States after the Egyptian coup). 
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the threat of Islamic terrorism, we, with our European and other 
allies, have to stop applying a double standard to Arabs and 
Muslims, including their fundamentalists, and, instead, have to 
recognize and affirmatively address the suffering all peoples in the 
Middle East have experienced. 
 
